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Introduction 
This thesis is composed by three essays and applies econometric methods to analyse 
different economic research questions. The first essay (chapter 1) studies the effect of 
Turkish public television on the voting behaviour of people in the early years of 
television broadcasting in Turkey. The second essay (chapter 2) analyses the 
intergovernmental grant allocation in Turkey to shed light discussion whether political 
motivations play role while central government transfers money to municipalities. 
The third essay (chapter 3) investigates the phenomenon of flypaper effect and its 
relation to the local tax effort, by using a new panel data set which consists of all 
province and district municipalities in Turkey.   
The first essay estimates the effect of television broadcasting on the vote shares of 
main political parties and voter turnout in 1970s. We particularly focus on main left 
wing party (Republican Peoples’ Party, RPP) and right wing party (Justice Party, JP) 
in 1969 and 1977 elections. Our main hypothesis is that television news content was 
biased in favour of the incumbent party in government due to the law which allows 
government to appoint general-director of the Turkish State Television Company 
(TRT). Hence Left ideological director-generals were appointed to the Turkish State 
Television Company in the first years of broadcasting. As a result of this, a left wing 
party, RPP, enjoyed this fact by increasing their vote shares in the elections in 1977; 
however the main right-wing party, JP, witnessed the vote shares to decrease in the 
same elections. Therefore we find that television reception influences the voting 
behaviour of the citizens. An estimation result also shows that voter turnout decreases 
with the introduction of television. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
one which explores this fact and use very detailed election data in Turkey.    
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The second essay (chapter 2) is related to the public finance literature which studies 
the transfers of intergovernmental grants from central government to municipalities. 
In Turkey, intergovernmental grants are transferred to the municipalities based on per 
capita rule only. This chapter explores whether there was a political motivation of 
revenue sharing system in Turkey using unique and new dataset. We employ 
Regression-Discontinuity Design to test this argument to get rid of possible 
endogeneity between grants and vote shares. We find that politically aligned 
municipalities to the party in central government enjoy about extra 7 Turkish Liras 
per capita in grants on average. This effect is stronger in municipalities where the 
elections were more competitive, i.e. the margin between vote shares of two main 
parties was very low. Moreover, we do find no evidence of alignment effect on 
municipal revenues and expenditures.  
In the third chapter, we investigate the phenomenon of flypaper effect by using a 
panel data set that consist of all province and district municipalities between 1997 and 
2005 in Turkey. We benefit from dynamic panel data specific Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimator to identify flypaper effect. Estimation results show that 
the flypaper does exist for the Turkish municipalities. This result is controlled by 
various econometric specifications where we consider endogeneity between fiscal 
variables. Coefficient estimates also reveal that Turkish municipalities experience 
substitution effect of unconditional grants on the revenue collection efforts of 
localities which means that grants substitute local revenues causing lesser local tax 
effort.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Television Reception and Its Effect on 
Political Outcomes, Evidence from 
Turkey. 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the political outcomes of mass media have attracted the 
attention of a considerable number of economists. Especially in developing 
countries, attempts to capture or influence the media outlets are a common trend 
employed by politicians to increase their visibility on the political scene.  
Information, just like everything else, plays an important role in how people vote and 
mass media transmits the bulk of information that people need in elections for their 
preferences about candidates and parties.  
Empirical analysis deals with identifying causal media effects using observational 
data. The effects of the entry of a new mass media and channel or the effects of the 
propagation in different time periods have been used. To make these new media 
tools available everywhere is not possible due to various reasons. Geography, lack of 
infrastructure or economical costs can be counted in this sense.  
Modern empirical research on mass media might trace this back to the 1930s. Hitler, 
for instance, used the radio for Nazi propaganda effectively. Using geographic and 
time variant radio availability in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939, the 
effect of radio on the public political attitude was remarkable. Before Hitler came to 
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the power, radio decreased Nazi electoral support significantly while after the 
Hitler’s appointment as a chancellor and the Nazi Party took control of radio, the 
vote share of the Nazis was higher in the next election (Adena, M., R. Enikolopov, 
M. Petrova, V. Santarosa and E. Zhuravskaya 2013).  
Political scientists look for an answer to the question of whether having more 
information is favourable for voters. The general conclusion from theory is that more 
information is beneficial for voters unless this information is about national security 
or personal details of regular citizens.  
Along with the introduction of television in 1968, the people in Turkey obtained 
another information source besides others such as radio, newspaper etc. Therefore it 
can be argued that citizens became more informed about the Turkish politics, parties 
and candidates.   
In this chapter, I study the effect of television broadcasting on the vote shares of 
main political parties and voter turnout in 1970s using the exogenous variation in 
television reception. I particularly focus on main left wing party (Republican 
Peoples’ Party, RPP) and right wing party (Justice Party, JP) in 1969 and 1977 
elections. Our main hypothesis is that television news content was biased in favour 
of the incumbent party in government due to the law which allows government to 
appoint general-director of the Turkish State Television Company (TRT). Hence 
Left ideological director-generals were appointed to the Turkish State Television 
Company in the first years of broadcasting. As a result of this, a left wing party, 
RPP, enjoyed this fact by increasing their vote shares in the elections in 1977; 
however the main right-wing party, JP, witnessed the vote shares to decrease in the 
same elections. Therefore we find that television reception influences the voting 
behaviour of the citizens. An estimation result also shows that voter turnout 
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decreases with the introduction of television. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is the first one which explores this fact and use very detailed election data in 
Turkey. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses political bias and its 
types. Section 3 briefly introduces literature review. Section 4 presents the media in 
Turkey. Section 5 discusses the political landscape of Turkey. Section 6 presents the 
structure of television reception in1970s. Section 7 gives data description. Section 8 
discusses the econometric strategy. We provide the results in section 9 and conclude 
the empirical findings in section 10.     
1.2 Political Bias  
Words have always been important in human communication. They influence us in a 
number of different ways. They may affect us in a positive way like making us laugh 
or in a negative way such as making we cry. As mass media is a bunch of words 
telling us about the world or any news that arouse interest of people, it definitely 
shapes people’s attitudes and behaviours. (Curran, J. 2002) provides a vivid 
illustration of the ways in which mass media, through their use of words, images and 
sounds, do things to the world. For instance, he argues how the emergence of the 
mass circulation newspaper gave a ‘voice’ to ordinary citizens, as opposed to the 
political elite. He also states that the mass media made the society more libertarian. 
With this notion it can be said that the world may become more equal, liberal and 
democratic. However in order this to happen there must not be asymmetric 
information between media outlets and citizens. Furthermore all the news produced 
by the media outlets must be unbiased. Typically the question is whether media 
accurately represent the world or whether they produce partial or uneven views.  
6 
 
Humanitarian calamities such as earthquakes, floods and famines happen with some 
frequency in the world. They regularly find a place in our news coverage. To give an 
example, in 2005 two hurricanes hit the American continent. Both caused more than 
a thousand people to die and both were the subject of media reports. But how? 
Hurricane Katrina which hit New Orleans was mentioned 3,105 times in UK papers 
whereas Hurricane Stanley which hit Guatemala was mentioned only 34 times 
(Franks, S. 2006, Street, J. 2011). This was a good example of bias in news 
reporting. This coverage was the product of a greater sympathy for the people of the 
United States than of Guatemala. This resulted in the former being perceived as the 
more ‘worthy’ victims. There are many other examples of selective reporting. All of 
these absolutely are done with some incentive from the journalist’s or agent’s 
perspective.        
Elections have always been the source of many of the accusations of political bias. 
During the presidential elections in 1996, Boris Yeltsin’s rivals complained that they 
were not given coverage to match that which he received in the mass media 
(Mickiewicz, E. and A. Richter 1996).  A similar story comes from Europe. In Italy, 
Silvio Berlusconi’s political opponents complained about their coverage relative to 
him (Ginsborg, P. 2005). In the United States, the same sense of injustice is 
expressed in arguments between liberals and the right, both of whom feel under-
represented.     
All these complaints arise from the fact that mass media affects political outcomes 
particularly as it relates to political behaviour and to the political behaviour of 
political elites. We live in a society that is open to being manipulated and controlled 
by new forms of communication. Especially today, social media such as Facebook 
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and Twitter are known as a crucial tool for politicians
1
 around the world to convey 
their views to the populations. Activist have also used social media and other social 
networking sites to rally the masses across the Middle East, Asia and especially 
North Africa where it is known as the starting point of ‘Arab Spring’.  
All these realities show that the political effect of mass media deserves highly 
concentrated research by researchers of political science and economy.  
1.2.1 Types of Bias 
Bias can appear in a variety of disguises. (McQuail, D. 1992) identifies four types of 
bias. They are to be distinguished by their place in a two-dimensional matrix. The 
first dimension concerns the ‘explicitness’ of the bias - whether it is open or hidden; 
the second dimension concerns the intention behind it - whether the bias is a result of 
some deliberate policy or a product of some ingrained, unconscious process. These 
two dimensions yield a useful set of categories for thinking about bias. 
1.2.1.1. Partisan Bias 
In this type of bias, a cause is explicitly and deliberately promoted. Examples can be 
given from editorial comments that recommend support for one political party or 
take sides in a policy controversy. It can show itself in the form of explicit 
recommendations to vote for one party or another, or it can be identified in the 
unconcealed endorsement of a cause. In most circumstances detecting such examples 
are not so difficult. 
                                                 
1
 For instance, according to Twitter data, the number of followers of some politicians on Twitter is as 
follows: Barack Obama, US President: 44.1 M, David Cameron (UK Prime Minister): 718K, Abdullah 
Gul (The President of the Republic of Turkey): 4.67 M.    
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1.2.1.2. Propaganda Bias  
This is involved where a story is reported with the deliberate intention of making the 
case for a particular party or policy or point of view, without explicitly stating this. 
Social security fraud or asylum seekers are reported as news, but in such a way as to 
make a particular point (about welfare scrounging or immigrants ‘swamping’ a 
country). This type of news leads the readers to generalize from the particular case. 
Sometimes the journalists put a racial image on to the front page of newspaper when 
reporting a crime. However racial imagery in the reporting of crime can trigger 
prejudgements about ethnic groups. Propaganda can also be detected in the way that 
national media report the activities of other countries. For example, Western media 
always have been criticized by the Middle East people and politicians for giving 
little or no place what has been going on in violence in those countries. These facts 
play an important role in reinforcing negative or wrong perceptions of political life 
in these foreign places (Seymour, E. and S. Barnett 2006).  
1.2.1.3. Unwitting Bias 
Newspapers do not have an infinite number of pages; similarly, news broadcasts 
have limited time slots in the schedule. Therefore what to include and what to 
exclude are the choices to be made. These decisions are about the ‘importance’ to be 
given to a story, and they are reflected in the item’s place in the running order or its 
place in the paper or in television broadcasting. Inevitably, these decisions involve a 
judgement about the issue or people involved. A journalistic convention is that what 
appears on the front page means that it is the most important news of the day. The 
same implication is carried by the ordering of broadcast news: the main stories are 
addressed first and most likely for a longer time. These judgements constitute a form 
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of bias: X matters more than Y. You can depict this as a particular political party 
and/or its leader deserves more space in the news programme. In this case, a 
distinctive bias is generated towards watchers and decision makers.  
1.2.1.4. Ideological bias  
McQuail (1992) characterizes this category of bias as hidden and unintended, and it 
can be detected only in a close reading of the text, where the hidden assumptions and 
value judgements can be extricated. One of the examples of this kind of bias can be 
revealed in coverage of the developing world. In some reports, researchers document 
that television presents an increasingly narrow picture of the wider world. 
International coverage remains limited with certain countries and continents, mainly 
North America, dominating world news. Even if there is some news related to the 
developing world, it is either about humanitarian disasters or military conflict. To the 
extent that coverage is dominated by such images, it can be seen to represent the 
wider world in general and the developing world in particular in an ideological form 
(Scott, M. 2009, Smith, J., L. Edge and V. Morris 2006). 
1.3. Literature Review 
1.3.1. Literature Review of Media and Election Outcomes 
Gentzkow, M. (2006) uses variation across markets in the timing of television`s 
introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout in the United States. He shows 
that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of 
newspapers and radio and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys. 
He found a significantly negative effect, accounting for between a quarter and a half 
of the total decline in turnout since 1950s.  
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Lehoucq, F. and D. L. Wall (2004) use several OLS models to evaluate the impact of 
sociological, institutional and spatial approaches to turnout across the municipalities 
of Guatemala. They find that more citizens turn out to vote as the size of a 
municipality decreases.  
The rational theory of voting suggests that while the payoff from voting increases, 
ceteris paribus, voter participation will increase also. In previous research, it is 
mentioned that broadcast media may have had some initial expansionary influence 
on voter participation in the initial years of the advent of radio and television; 
however it was soon exhausted (Campbell, A. 1962). 
In an article based on a telephone survey of Copenhagen voters, it was found that 
there is a causal effect of being informed on the propensity to vote in a referendum 
setting. The average treatment effect of being informed on the propensity to vote is 
20 percentage points.  
Settle, R. F. and B. A. Abrams (1976) study the effects of some explanatory 
variables besides radio and television ownership on voter turnout in USA. They find 
that positive and generally significant coefficients on the radio and television 
variables indicate that more media related information about candidates encourage 
voting. They also suggest that income is negatively related to voter turnout.    
In a recent study which has been built on assumptions about the way media markets 
affect politics, it is showed that newspapers have a robust positive effect on political 
participation (Gentzkow, M., J. M. Shapiro and M. Sinkinson 2009). They estimate 
that one additional newspaper increases both prudential and congressional turnout by 
approximately 0.3 percentage points. An interesting result is that the effect on 
presidential turnout decreases after the introduction of radio and television. Their 
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result is consistent with a model based on newspapers affecting the political process 
mainly by providing information.    
Literature on media effect has significantly grown in recent years. DellaVigna, S. 
and E. Kaplan (2007) have looked for an answer for the question, “does media bias 
affect voting behaviour?” They analyse the entry of Fox News in cable markets and 
its impact on voting. After the conservative Fox News Channel was introduced into 
the market in 1996, it is found that there is a significant effect of the introduction of 
Fox News on the vote share in presidential elections between 1996 and 2000. 
Republicans gained 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in the towns that broadcast Fox 
News.   
Oberholzer-Gee, F. and J. Waldfogel (2006) find that Hispanic voter turnout 
increased by 5 to 10 percentage points, relative to non-Hispanic voter turnout, in 
markets where local Spanish Language television news became available. Their 
argument is that television carries both local and national news which are relevant 
for people in elections. 
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, T. Nenova and A. Shleifer (2001) examine ownership 
patterns of media in 97 countries across the world. They find that powerful local 
families hold the private media in their hands. Another salient fact is that 29% of the 
press and 60% of television companies are state-owned particularly in Africa and the 
Middle East. This evidence supports the idea that the governments may enjoy the 
large potential benefits of controlling media.  
Besley, T. and A. Prat (2006) examine the relationship between state ownership, 
concentration, turnover and corruption. They compare the average number of years 
of political leaders (typically prime ministers or presidents) among countries with 
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low and high state ownership of newspapers. Political leaders stay in power for 7.21 
more years where the high state ownership exists (more than 30% market share). 
Introduction of a new media permits exploration of the effects of mass media access 
on any interested outcome in a more convincing way. Mass media access is not 
uniformly distributed to everyone. Any mass media forms its specific distribution of 
informed and uninformed voters due to its specific cost and revenue structure. 
Therefore, any change in the mass media environment causes substantial differences 
between citizens who have access to political information and those who do not.  
In this sense, Strömberg, D. (2004) attempts to measure the impact of the 
introduction of radio government policy and voter turnout. He investigates whether 
radio increased voter turnout and mainly focuses on radio’s impact on public 
spending. He begins from the fact that radio was introduced in the United States in 
the early 1920s, and spread quickly to reach a household penetration of around 80 
percent by 1940.  He argues that governors allocated more funds to areas where 
voter turnout was higher than other places. What he argues is that if radio ownership 
increases the probability of turnout, then radio can also affect the allocation of relief 
spending via turnout. Voter turnout is likely to increase with radio penetration since 
people who listen to the radio become better informed about politics and therefore 
also more likely to vote. He finds that an increase in the share of households with 
radios by one percent increases turnout by 0.12 percent.   
1.3.2 Media Capture 
Following Besley, T. and A. Prat (2006), political outcomes depend on the 
information of the electorate. If voters obtain true information about the incumbent’s 
type, they are more likely to change from bad politicians to good ones. This leads the 
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turnover to be high and increases welfare of the state since it improves the quality of 
government. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the probability of the 
arising of malfeasance and the media’s monitoring ability. The probability that a 
scandal will erupt is an inverse U-shaped function of the media monitoring ability. If 
the monitoring ability is low that means politicians never get caught, then scandals 
come to light very rarely. However when the monitoring ability is high, politicians 
abstain from involving graft since they are sure that they will be caught.  
Media control is difficult when there are many media outlets rather than when 
ownership is unique or only a few. This stems from the fact that politicians must 
offer many more bribes if there are numerous media outlets to convince them not to 
write bad news about politicians. Since this increases the cost of turning free media 
news down, attempts to control media in the country will be very rare. Until 1990, 
Turkey had only one television company, TRT (Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation), a state-owned company. Therefore it is inevitable that politicians or 
the incumbent party would influence its broadcasting manner in their own favour. 
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Controlling media in a monopolistic market is easier than in a competitive market 
since the revenue of the media company might be highly dependent on government 
advertisements. For instance  Petrova, M. (2011) emphasizes that higher advertising 
revenues make media firms more independent from external political influences. 
Using data from 19
th
 century American newspapers she shows that in cities with 
higher advertising revenues, newspapers were more likely to be free from political 
parties.   
1.4. The Media in Turkey in 1970s 
The radio became a crucial tool in the 1950s after its broad use as a site of 
propaganda by the Democrat Party (DP) government (Beybin, K. D. 2001). 
Therefore those years in Turkish broadcasting history have been called a “partisan 
radio” period (Aksoy, M. 1960). It is argued that the state radio did not allow the 
speeches of opposition party members to be read. Yet the discourses given by the DP 
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members of parliament were read on the radio and lasted for hours. Consequently, a 
public cooperation, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) was authorized with the 
aim of independent broadcasting in 1964.  However it was not sufficient in practice 
since TRT was still subject to partisan use (Sahin, H. 1981).  
1.4.1. Television in 1970 
Television was introduced in 1968 and until 1985, the year in which the second 
channel began broadcasting, there was only one black and white channel transmitted 
to the public. The fact that there was only one television channel in the country 
might have caused biased news and programmes in favour of the ruling party. 
Beybin (2001) also states that opposition parties and most of the journalists 
endeavoured to impede the government’s pervasive use of television for its own 
goals and biased news on the media. Another example of conflict can be given from 
the 1989 local elections. The High Election Board of Turkey warned TRT about its 
broadcast after SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti), opposition party at that time, 
applied several times to the Board to stop TRT’s partisan broadcasting. 
Consequently, TRT did not broadcast the program related to the government’s 
activities which was on the program guide a day before the election.  What is 
prominent after the local elections held in 1989 is that opposition parties obtained a 
victory and took over many municipalities from the Mother Land Party (Anavatan 
Partisi), and that Prime Minister Ozal forced the general director of TRT to resign.   
1.4.2. Administration of TRT in the 1970s. 
Turkey has a history of coup d’états and it witnessed a military memorandum on 12 
March 1971.  This memorandum had some negative effects especially on TRT’s 
sovereignty. After this memorandum, TRT’s sovereignty was upheld by law. Aysel 
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Aziz (1975) points out that TRT was exposed to government influence and other 
groups’ pressure after this law change.  
The coalition government formed by RPP (Republican People’s Party), which is a 
left wing party, and NSP (National Salvation Party), which is an Islamic Party, 
appointed a director-general to the TRT. Ismail Cem Ipekci
2
 was criticised hugely by 
the conservatives and prominent right-wing figures because of his left political 
leanings. They were not unfair since he became an MP for the Republican People’s 
Party (RPP) and Democratic Left Party (DLP) in later years. Another criticism made 
of the director-general was his age. According to the law, the minimum age for a 
person to be general manager of TRT was 40. Another criteria was that a candidate 
must have had at least 15 years’ state service experience. Ismail Cem did not fulfil 
these criteria. Therefore, the prime minister of that period, Bulent Ecevit, attempted 
to issue a decree in favour of him in order to surpass the law. All these factors 
indicate how crucial the appointment to the TRT Company was for politicians. 
Naturally, television program contents might have affected bias to the incumbent 
government. Therefore our main hypothesis is the control of Television Company by 
the left-wing party appointed director-manager via Ismail Cem Ipekci would benefit 
the left-wing party and harm the right-wing party in the 1977 election.  
It is also worth to mention here that there was upward trend of left-wing parties 
during 1970s as it is seen in figure 3. However, we argue that the increase in left-
wing party vote share was higher with television reception.  
                                                 
2
 Ismail Cem Ipekci was appointed as a director-general to the TRT and his period of management 
lasted 500 days.  He is known as the youngest manager (34 years old) in TRT history. He was 
appointed Minister of Culture in 1995, and then he served as Minister of Foreign affairs from 30 
June 1997 until 11 July 2002.  
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Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), appealed to the 
Supreme Electoral Council, offering fair time allocation for the parties in Turkish 
parliament. The actual rule stated that all parties must have equal time slots on 
television no matter their representative ratio of citizens. Since the parties have 
different number of MPs in the parliament and they have heterogeneity to represent 
the citizens based on their vote shares in the elections, TRT would have to 
accommodate more time on television news for the larger party than for the others. 
His main argument was that the responsibility of the main party to the public is 
higher when compared to parties with small number of seats.   
1.5. Political Landscape of Turkey 
The first multiparty elections in republican Turkey were held in 1946, though there is 
general agreement that these were not completely free and fair. However, only four 
years later, the government changed peacefully and democratically through popular 
election. The outcome of the 1950 election was rather dramatic. The party 
(Republican People’s Party, CHP) that had founded the Republic was voted down, 
and the opposition (Democrat Party, DP), who were to govern Turkey for the 
following decade, won the election with a stunning 83.8 percent parliamentary 
majority. The DP`s ten-year rule was ended by a coup on May 27, 1960. In 1961, 
electoral politics resumed with a new constitution and election law that introduced 
proportional representation.   
Although the multi-party era of Turkey experienced three democratic breakdowns 
and military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, popular elections for national and local 
public offices have become institutionalized in Turkey (Carkoglu, A. and E. 
Kalaycioglu 2007).  
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The years 1961 and 1980 came under the influence of the liberal 1961 Constitution 
and multi-party pluralism, which led to multiplication of political parties in the 
National Assembly, coalition governments and voluntary associations and a vigorous 
and free press. The load of mass political participation became so important for the 
political system that it failed to cope with it. The Turkish political system was 
interrupted again in 1980 by the military forces. A first parliamentary election after 
the coup was made in 1983. In comparison to the pre 1980 period of Turkey, Turkish 
voting participation rates seem to be quite high in the post 1983 period.    
A high proportion of citizens participated in the first election after 1980 coup. The 
citizens demonstrated their protest to military intervention by using their democratic 
rights. The government which was formed by Turgut Ozal adopted liberal politics 
particularly in the economic area. Turkey has become more open to the world 
economy. As a result of this kind of politics, Turkey’s economy and politics 
improved gradually in terms of human rights, gross domestic product and 
international trade.  
1.6. Television and Reception 
In the 1970s Turkey had only one television channel that broadcasted over the air 
and it was the government-run channel, Turkish Radio Television (TRT). TRT 
started television broadcasting in 1968 with a very limited time a day and rapidly 
increased its broadcasting day and times with the support of state investments. 
General information about transmitter locations, its powers and coverage across 
Turkey can be found in table 9 in the appendix. With the help of the State Planning 
Organization of Turkey, the population who could receive the television 
broadcasting was expanded. Despite all these attempts to cover all the country with 
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television broadcasting, it is not sufficient for the people to watch television in their 
homes. People must also be able to afford to buy a television set in order to watch 
television channels. In the 1970s the number of television receivers was relatively 
less than other countries. Two main reasons can be counted. Firstly, television 
broadcasting was very new for the population and the schedule of programmes did 
not run for the whole day. Secondly, Turkey had no capacity to produce domestic 
television sets, rather they were imported from other developed countries. For this 
reason, the price of televisions was so high due to import taxes.   Therefore it is 
crucial to know the total number of receivers for years and per cities. The number of 
television receivers between 1970 and 1975 can be seen in table 10. As seen in this 
table, the number of television receivers went up very quickly. The reason for the 
number in 1970 is that there was no obligation for television set ownership to be 
registered to the authorities until 1971. After 1971, TRT announced to the public that 
anyone who bought a television set must inform PTT (The Directorate of Post, 
Telephone and Telegraph). Hence, the number of television receivers has been 
obtained thanks to this organization.  
The distribution of receivers is based on television signal. The number of receivers 
was intense at the province centres because of signal strength. There was a very 
limited number of receivers in the villages due to lack of electricity and signal 
strength. Television transmitters were set up especially to the areas where the 
population density is high just because more people could watch television. 
According to a study in 1973, 5930 villages were under the signal coverage; however 
in only 184 out of 5930 villages were there television receiver owners. It is also 
noted that there was no electricity in 1076 villages (Kocabasoglu, U. 1973). Table 4 
presents the number of receivers in 3 big cities in Turkey.  Table 11 shows that while 
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the number of receivers in Ankara was rather high in 1971, in the next three years it 
increased gradually, with an abnormal rise in Istanbul. Doubtless, the main reason 
for this is that the broadcasting in Istanbul was relatively later than Ankara and 
people living in Istanbul had more income than those who lived in other cities. 
Therefore once the television signals covered Istanbul, the number of people 
watching television immediately rose. Izmir, the third largest city of Turkey, 
witnessed a doubled increase in the number of television receivers albeit total 
ownership was less.  
It is possible that the number of people who had receivers during this period may 
have been less in settlements, so it may negatively affect the results. In reality, there 
is the fact of collective watching. In developing countries where the television sets 
are relatively expensive, people would go to their relatives or neighbours who have a 
television receiver to watch television (Aziz, A. 1975). So they would enjoy 
watching television and of course this increased the number of people who are 
exposed to the television broadcasting. For instance, if there were one television 
receiver in a village, it means that most people were informed about television news 
and programmes. Aziz, A. (1999) calls these new visiting people as “tele-
neighbours”. Hence, in spite of collective watching, we would argue that many 
inhabitants found a chance to follow the news by using television over the years even 
if there were no attempts to spread television transmitters across the country.  
1.7. Data 
The election data comes from the Turkish Statistical Institute. Province (il) centre 
and district level election results (ilce) are available to download in the electronic 
environment, however village level data are not provided as such. Instead we 
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collected village level election data by hand one by one for each village from archive 
files.  
In the regression analysis we use a number of control variables. Socio-Demographic 
controls come from the Turkish Census of 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975. The district 
and village level variables we use are logarithms of population, gender ratio and 
fraction of people over 18. Where possible we also include the share of people with 
literacy and high school degrees to the regressions in order to take account for 
educational effects on dependent variables.  
We also collect geographical distance data of villages and districts to the city centres 
and transmitter locations. The sources for these variables are Google Earth and 
ArcGIS package programs. These programs enable us to calculate geographical 
distance between locations of our interest.  
1.8. Empirical Strategy and Specification 
1.8.1. Differences in Differences Method 
The main idea of this method is to find equivalents of treatment and control groups 
in which everything apart from the variable of interest (or other things that can be 
controlled for) are assumed to be the same. But this is often a very difficult claim to 
make as it is rarely possible to do this perfectly in which case observed differences 
between treatment and control groups may be the result of some other omitted 
variables.  
But, even if one might not be prepared to make the assumption that the treatment and 
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control groups are the same in every respect apart from the treatment one might be 
prepared to make the assumption that, in the absence of treatment, the unobserved 
differences between treatment and control groups are the same over time. 
In this case one could use data on treatment and control group before the treatment to 
estimate the ‘normal’ difference between treatment and control group and then 
compare this with the difference after the receipt of treatment. A graph will make the 
idea clearer. 
 
 
If one just used data from the post-treatment period then one would estimate the 
treatment effect as the distance AB – this estimate being based on the assumption 
that the only reason for observing a difference in outcome between treatment and 
control group is the receipt of treatment. 
In contrast the ‘difference-in-difference’ estimator will take the ‘normal’ difference 
between the treatment and control group as the distance CB and estimate the 
treatment effect as the distance AC. 
y 
Pre Post 
Control 
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A 
B 
C 
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Differences and Differences is a version of fixed effect estimation. To see this more 
formally: 
1 :itY  Vote share of party or Voter Turnout at location i, time t with Television 
Reception 
0 :itY  Vote share of party or Voter Turnout at location i, time t without Television 
Reception 
In practice of course we only observe one or the other at the same time. 
We then assume that: 
 | i, toit i tE Y      
In the absence of television reception, vote share or voter turnout is determined by 
the sum of a time-invariant province or district effect i and a year effect t ,that is 
common across provinces or districts.  
Let itD  be a dummy for television reception available locations and year. 
Assuming  1 0 | ,it itE Y Y i t     is the treatment effect, observed political outcome 
can be written: 
it i t it itY D         
Let locations with television reception be TV and locations without television 
reception NOTV. 
Hence; 
In TV: 
Political Outcome in 1969 elections is: 
  1969| i TV, t 1969it TVE Y        
Political Outcome in 1977 elections is: 
  1977| i TV, t 1977it TVE Y         
The difference between 1977 and 1969 elections is: 
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    1977 1969| , 1977 | , 1969it itE Y i TV t E Y i TV t             
In NOTV: 
Political Outcome in 1969 is: 
  1969| i , t 1969it NOTVE Y NOTV       
Political Outcome in 1977 is: 
  1977| i , t 1977it NOTVE Y NOTV       
So, the difference between 1977 and 1969 elections is: 
    1977 1969| , 1977 | , 1969it itE Y i NOTV t E Y i NOTV t            
The differences in differences strategy amounts to comparing the change in political 
outcome in TV to the change in political outcomes in NOTV. The population 
differences-in-differences are: 
     
 
| , 1977 | , 1969 | , 1977
| , 1969
it it it
it
E Y i TV t E Y i TV t E Y i NOTV t
E Y i NOTV t 
       
   
  
This is estimated using the sample analog of the population means. 
In this paper, I use television reception as an exogenous determinant of television 
watching. In 1970s Turkey, it is very difficult to find survey data asking the 
households whether they have a television in their homes or how many hours a day 
they spent watching television. There are very few studies of television ownership 
for the aforementioned years, but they are restricted only to the big city centres like 
Ankara and Istanbul. In this paper, I include 10 cities
3
 where television transmitters 
set up before 1976.  
Television signals cannot be blocked by the city or country borders by their nature. 
Therefore when a transmitter is built on a mountain so that it penetrates a larger area, 
television signals might reach different places by decreasing its signal strength.  
                                                 
3
 Province centres that own television transmitters in 1976: Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakir, Edirne, 
Eskisehir, Gaziantep. Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun and Trabzon.  
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It is obvious to use an exogenous determinant of television watching to isolate the 
causal effect of media exposure due to some potential reverse causality issues. For 
example, the government might have set up television transmitters to some cities in 
which there was more voting potential for the incumbent party in the upcoming 
elections. Here I use the fact that the mountainous structure of Turkey creates a 
variation in television reception that is uncorrelated to other district characteristics. 
This variation on media exposure can be seen in Figure 1, which shows television 
penetration in different geographic areas of Turkey. Areas with television signal 
available are shown in bold black borders.  
I run the regression using Differences-in-Differences (DD) estimation method. DD 
has become an increasingly popular method among applied economists to identify 
causal relationships. In DD estimation the difference in outcomes after and before 
the intervention for groups affected by the treatment is compared with the unaffected 
or so called control group. So with the help of this strategy, I compare the election 
outcomes of the districts or villages that are exposed by the television signal with 
those that are not exposed. The main period I am interested is the 1970s. I use 
election data from the 1969 election and 1977 election. The reason why I chose this 
time period is that I try to present the initial effects of watching television on election 
outcomes. Based on television coverage data, nobody living in Turkey was watching 
television during the 1969 election; however some provinces were enabled to watch 
television in 1977 thanks to the transmitters located in areas where they could 
penetrate much more places. In the baseline specification, I include all 67 provinces 
and their districts into the analysis. One may posit that the government might have 
set up transmitters to the locations where they could easily manipulate electorates 
and increase their vote shares in the next election. Or there may be another reason 
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determining the transmitter locations such as that these provinces with television 
were already going to vote for the incumbent party. Therefore the government might 
have rewarded them with television. To overcome these endogeneity problems, I 
follow a challenging strategy which is widely used in recent empirical political 
economy of mass media literature.  
The strategy is that I identify the locations penetrated by the television signals in 
related years with the help of a simulation programme. This package programme is 
commonly used at television companies as well as TRT. The output of this 
simulation is that it provides us the areas where television signals reach. In fact, due 
to topologic features of the earth, it is a sinuous or zigzag shaped template. Figure 1 
presents the location of 10 transmitters in 1976 and areas with television reception. 
Thus, it is seen from this figure that there is a large variation across provinces as well 
as within-province. Even in those provinces with television transmitters, some 
districts were able to enjoy watching television whereas some were not.   
First, we examine the effect of television availability (identified as an indicator 
variable) on the vote shares of two main parties of the era, Justice Party (JP), 
Republican People’s Party (RPP) using the following specification, which we 
estimate for the elections of 1969 and 1977: 
 0 1 2 3 4( * )it i t i t it i itY TV Post TV Post                (1.1) 
where i indexes districts and t indexes elections, itY  is the dependent variable i.e., 
vote share of a party or voter turnout in district i in election period t, TV takes the 
value of 1 if the municipality or village are penetrated by television signal and 0 
otherwise. it is the vector of state and time varying covariates. i  is province fixed 
effects. Standard errors are adjusted to allow for clusters within each province. The 
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coefficient that we are interested in is 3 , the interaction between treatment and post 
dummies. This coefficient gives us the causal effect of television on political 
outcomes.   
1.9. Estimation Results 
Table 1 presents the results of estimation of the equation (1.1) for the vote share of 
the main right-wing (Justice Party) and left-wing party (Republican People’s Party) 
by comparing general election results in 1969 and 1977 without any controls 
(Column 1 and 4), with Census demographic controls (Column 2 and 5) and with all 
controls and province fixed effects (Column 3 and 6). This estimation constitutes the 
full sample of the analysis such that I include all province and district centres into 
the regression whether they have television reception or not. As explained in 
previous sections, there were 7 provinces centres where television transmitters were 
established. Due to geographic and topographic features of the ground, some districts 
were penetrated by the television signals and some were not. There were also some 
other district centres or villages that belonged to other province administration to 
which television signals reached. In other words, let’s say that one or a couple of 
districts were watching television whereas the people who lived in the province 
centre of that district were not enjoying television.  
Given data obtained after simulation that enables us to see which areas are 
penetrated by signals, I compare the places (all district and province centres of 
Turkey)
4
 of television reception with no television reception. Table 1, which shows 
my full sample, indicates that in all specifications television decreases the right party 
                                                 
4
 In 1976, there were 67 provinces and 571 districts in Turkey.  
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vote shares whereas it increases left wing party vote shares in the 1977 election. In 
the specification with controls and fixed effects (Column 3 and 6), the availability of 
television signals raises the vote share for the left-wing party by 5.926 percentage 
points. Likewise the availability of television causes the right wing party share to 
decrease by 2.948 percentage points. Both coefficients are statistically significant.  
A key concern related to Diff and Diff estimation is the omitted variable bias that 
may affect the outcome of interest. Above, we also introduce a set of control 
variables such as population, gender ratio, population over 18 years old and 
geographical and province dummies to control whether they affect the results. If 
there is bias in the estimates due to an omitted variable, when we add control 
variables, the magnitude of coefficient should be lowered and becomes insignificant. 
However it is clearly seen in table 1 that the point estimate of the effect of television 
remains similar with the addition of controls. So I find that the districts with TRT 
reception voted more for the incumbent party and less for the opposition party.  
Following equation (1.1), I analyse the effect of television on voter turnout. I present 
direct comparisons of turnout in districts by the year when their first television 
station began broadcasting. I run the regression with the province fixed effects. Voter 
turnout is the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in the election. The 
results from this regression are presented in table 2. In table 2, the first column 
shows basic regression without any controls and fixed effects. The second and third 
columns include control variables and both fixed effects and controls respectively. 
The results show that television caused a significant decline in voter turnout in 
provinces and districts where television was watched by citizens. The magnitude of 
this effect drops with added controls but remains statistically significant. In the 
complete specification, introduction of television causes turnout to fall by 2.192 
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percentage points between two elections. This result provides a parallel conclusion 
with Gentzkow, M. (2006) study where he also finds a negative effect of television 
on voter turnout in the US elections. We can argue that people living in the areas 
where television broadcasting began went less to the polls compared to the areas 
without television reception. This might have occurred due to substitution effect of 
time for the people. The entertainment programmes might have hindered the voters 
to use their citizenship duty. In political participation literature, it is argued that 
people began to have been informed less with the introduction of television. The 
reason is that people obtained political information by reading newspapers or 
listening to the radio, however there were also entertainment programmes such as 
films and television series on television beside news. Therefore television might 
have taken over people’s time that was spent on obtaining news about politics 
before.   
The fact that television availability is significantly correlated with voting outcomes 
before the introduction of television is a potential concern, since this may point out 
that some unobservable characteristics of districts determining our outcomes of 
interest are correlated with television availability. This would bias the results that 
rely on the variation in the television reception. In order to overcome this concern, I 
eliminate the provinces where the state did not build any transmitter. At the same 
time, I also take into account some districts reached by television signals in those 
particular provinces. This dataset constitutes my baseline results. By doing that it 
enables us just to compare close districts with the ones where there is no television 
signal. Table 3 presents the results of this exercise for the vote shares of two main 
left-wing and right-wing parties in the baseline sample without province fixed effects 
and controls (Column 1), with geographic and Census demographic controls 
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(Column 2), and with all fixed effects and controls (Column 3).  The results show 
that television availability had visibly different effects on the two main party vote 
shares. There is a negative and significant effect of television on the change in the 
Justice Party vote share whereas television boosts the Republican People’s Party 
vote share between the elections of 1969 and 1977. In the specification with controls 
and fixed effects, the availability of state television decreases the vote share for the 
right-wing party (Justice Party) by 3.8 percentage points and increases the vote share 
of the left-wing party (Republican People’ Party) by 3.1 percentage points. Although 
the magnitude of the coefficients is lower relative to the extended sample, it is 
statistically significant.  
Table 4 displays the results of the effects of television availability on the other 
political outcome, which is voter turnout. Similar to table 2, reproducing results from 
the baseline sample, the availability of television has a negative effect on voter 
turnout. People living in districts with television reception used their democratic 
rights for the election less than those who did not watch television. Exposure to 
television lowered the voter turnout 1.45 percentage points in the specification with 
full controls and fixed effects.  
Figure 2 in appendix illustrates the decline on vote share of Justice Party (JP) in 
1969 and 1977 elections by comparing locations with and without television 
reception. Blue dashed line represents the locations with television reception 
whereas red solid line shows the locations without television reception. It is clearly 
illustrated in the graph that Justice Party vote share was higher about 2 percentage 
points in locations in 1969 election when there was no television in Turkey; however 
its vote share was lower about 2.5 percentage points at locations with television 
reception in 1977 election.  
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Figure 3 in appendix presents left wing (RPP) and right wing parties’ votes share in 
the general elections held in 1969, 1973 and 1977. Figure 3 shows that RPP 
increases its voters while JP loses its support in Turkey.      
1.9.1 Village Level Regression 
In order to get more convincing results, I endeavour to find villages barely 
penetrated by television signals. For this work, I use the map (figure 1) showing 
penetrated areas within the provinces. I gather all coordinates of places in Turkey in 
village, county, district and province level
5
. I obtain a huge data set that gives me 
around 28.500 coordinates of places in Turkey. I use ARCGIS to figure out places 
on the map and search villages near to the border where television signals are 
blocked by mountainous areas. For consistence, border village sample was 
constructed taking villages 5 km either side of the television reception border. This 
means that all settlements are scanned around the television reception borders which 
are represented with zigzags in Figure 1. By using this analysis, I compare only 
villages that could barely reach television signals with the villages where there is no 
television reception.  
I test whether television affects election outcomes, in particular vote shares of the 
main political parties and voter turnout by estimating the following OLS regression:
  
0 1 2 3 4( * )it i t i t it i itY TV Post TV Post                (1.2) 
 in which  itY  denotes again vote share of parties or voter turnout in village i 
depending on specification, TV takes the value of 1 if the municipality or village are 
                                                 
5
 This data come from the indexmundi.com website. This website provides country facts all over the 
world as well as all the latitude, longitude and elevation data for all places in the particular country 
asked for.   
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penetrated by television signal and 0 otherwise. it is the vector of state and time 
varying covariates. i  is village level fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted to 
allow for clusters within each province. Again the coefficient that we are interested 
in is 3 , the interaction between treatment and post dummies. This coefficient gives 
us the causal effect of television on political outcomes.   
Table 5 gives us the effect of television on the two main parties’ vote shares at 
village level. The result is interesting that television does not affect vote shares of 
parties. While television reception stimulates left-wing party vote shares and hinders 
right-party votes at province and district level, it is shown that there is no effect at 
village level. It might be contrary to the previous result; however the economic and 
developmental reality of Turkey in those years clarifies the case. In 1976, very low 
numbers of villages did have electricity that is obviously necessary to switch on 
television sets. According to the Energy Ministry of Turkey, only 20 percent of all 
villages had electricity and most of them were the villages close to the province or 
district centres. This fraction is very low even in rural areas of Turkey. Therefore we 
can say that the coefficient of interested variable in regression is statistically 
insignificant.  
The same story is also valid for the voter turnout effect of television. Table 6 
provides the estimation results when the dependent variable is political participation 
in the elections. Although the sign of coefficient of the interaction variable is 
negative as we expected, it is not statistically significant. Actually these results 
convince us that television really influences political outcomes if there are enough 
technical infrastructures that enable the ownership of television sets.  
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1.9.2 Placebo Tests 
To provide additional evidence in favour of our identification assumptions, we show 
that Turkish television availability is not associated with outcomes that it was not 
supposed to affect. Specifically what we do is that we test whether television 
availability dummy in 1977 affected the change in the share of votes received by the 
same left-wing and right-wing parties in the elections held in 1961 and 1965. In 
order that our empirical strategy is correctly specified, one should not expect any 
effect since television broadcasting did not begin in that period. In addition, we 
verify that the voter turnout in parliamentary elections in 1961 and 1965 is not 
related to television signal availability. We include exactly the same places that are 
used in the main regressions to capture whether the difference in political outcomes 
is only driven by television signal availability. As a result, we do not find a 
significant association between television signal availability and any of these placebo 
outcomes (see table 7), which strengthens our identification assumptions.   
1.10. Conclusion 
This chapter documents the effect of Turkish public television on voting behaviour 
in the early years of television broadcasting in Turkey. We find that the content of 
television programmes and management ideology plays an important role in the 
parliamentary elections.  
Left ideological director-generals were appointed to the Turkish State Television 
company in 1970s. As a result of this, a left-wing party (Republican People’s Party) 
enjoyed this fact by increasing their vote shares in the elections in 1977 whereas the 
main right-wing party (Justice Party) vote shares decreased. We find that television 
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reception influences the voting behaviour of the citizens. Voter turnout also 
decreases with the introduction of television. This is actually explained in the 
political science literature as the main source for people to obtain information about 
politics was through reading newspapers and listening to the radio during those 
years. Besides the news programmes on television, there were also television series 
and films that attracted people more. Therefore they went to the polls less than 
before in the 1977 elections.  
Our findings suggest that mass media play a crucial role in the process of 
institutional change. Even today, Turkey has many agendas with the presidential 
elections which will be the first in terms of people choosing the president by voting 
rather than MPs voting. TRT (Turkish State Television) is still criticized by the 
candidates of other parties for not allocating fair news time compared to Recep 
Tayyib Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey and the AKP candidate.  
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Appendix 
  Figure 1: Map of area penetrated by Television Signals in 1976 
 
Notes 1: Stars in the figure show the location of television transmitter in each province and Television coverage is 
presented by plotted areas in the map. It is fractured due to mountainous areas. 
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Figure 2: Vote Share of Justice Party in locations with and without television reception  
 
 
Figure 3: Vote Share of Republican’s People Party and Justice Party in 1969, 1973 and 1977 elections. 
 
Notes: Vote share of JP in 1973 election is together with Democratic Party vote share, which is 
founded by leaders, broke away from Justice Party. I include this to show total share of two main right 
wing parties in 1973 election. 
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Table 1: Turkish State Television and vote for main right-wing and left-wing parties, Full sample 
 Vote Share for the right-wing party Vote Share for the left-wing party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Justice Party Justice Party Justice Party Republican 
People’s Party 
Republican 
People’s Party 
Republican 
People’s Party 
       
Television Available 1.389 1.556 0.700 3.350** 2.767** -0.332 
 (2.521) (1.307) (1.440) (1.663) (1.223) (1.411) 
Post -8.660*** -13.739*** -9.571*** 9.689*** 6.531*** 8.408*** 
 (0.692) (0.879) (0.786) (0.919) (0.847) (0.886) 
Television*Post -2.702* -4.661*** -2.948*** 6.482*** 5.196*** 5.926*** 
 (1.577) (1.218) (1.057) (1.846) (1.207) (1.242) 
Constant 43.747*** 27.771*** 50.001*** 31.102*** -8.591 9.453 
 (1.614) (8.267) (7.029) (0.970) (6.902) (7.287) 
       
Province Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Census Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 
R-squared 0.081 0.192 0.510 0.159 0.192 0.381 
Notes 2: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of eligible voters. The dependent variables are Vote share of Justice 
Party and Republican People’s Party respectively. We include population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 years old as control variables. In full sample, all 
provinces and district centres are included in Turkey.  The standard errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for correlation between districts in the same 
province, significant levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2: Television Reception and Political Participation, Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voter Turnout Voter Turnout  Voter Turnout 
    
Television Available 0.470 1.584 -0.625 
 (1.781) (1.129) (1.161) 
Post 12.886*** 13.862*** 16.872*** 
 (0.742) (0.636) (0.628) 
Television*Post -3.999*** -3.391*** -2.192** 
 (1.197) (1.022) (1.016) 
Constant 59.143*** 79.634*** 103.127*** 
 (0.620) (5.818) (5.448) 
    
Province Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Census Controls No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276 
R-squared 0.289 0.312 0.516 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of 
eligible voters. The dependent variables are Vote share of Justice Party and Republican People’s 
Party respectively. We include population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 years 
old as control variables. In full sample, all provinces and district centres are included in Turkey.  The 
standard errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for correlation between districts in 
the same province, significant levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3: Television Penetration and Party Vote Shares, Baseline sample 
 Vote Share for the right-wing party Vote Share for the left-wing party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Justice Party  Justice Party  Justice Party  Republican 
People’s 
Party  
Republican 
People’s Party 
Republican 
People’s 
Party 
       
Television available 1.740 2.541 1.358 2.935 2.289 0.781 
 (2.748) (1.680) (1.562) (1.994) (1.554) (1.507) 
Post -7.364*** -11.240*** -7.164*** 12.191*** 8.417*** 10.191*** 
 (0.768) (1.296) (1.322) (1.599) (1.354) (1.374) 
Television*Post -3.997** -5.298*** -3.836*** 3.980* 2.520* 3.189** 
 (1.541) (1.402) (1.316) (1.975) (1.492) (1.522) 
Constant 43.396*** 25.395*** 60.750*** 31.517*** -3.826 7.673 
 (2.433) (9.266) (9.527) (1.974) (10.191) (10.333) 
Province fixed 
effects 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Census and 
Geographic Controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 524 524 524 524 524 524 
R-squared 0.112 0.182 0.457 0.259 0.310 0.484 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of eligible voters. This baseline sample 
includes only the provinces which at least one county penetrated by television signal. We include population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and 
population over 18 years old as control variables The standard errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for correlation between 
districts in the same province.  *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,* significant at 10%.  
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Table 4: Voter Turnout and Television Reception, Baseline Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voter Turnout Voter Turnout Voter Turnout 
    
Television Available -0.876 -0.005 -1.191 
 (1.689) (1.315) (1.229) 
Post 11.832*** 12.246*** 15.422*** 
 (1.431) (1.054) (1.059) 
Television*Post -2.945* -2.548** -1.450 
 (1.455) (1.291) (1.266) 
Constant 60.489*** 60.614*** 91.354*** 
 (1.056) (8.157) (8.274) 
    
Province fixed effects No No Yes 
Census and Geographic 
Controls 
No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 524 524 524 
R-squared 0.230 0.250 0.507 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of eligible 
voters. This baseline sample includes only the provinces which at least one county penetrated by television 
signal. We include population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 years old as control variables 
The standard errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for correlation between districts in the 
same province. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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        Table 5: Turkish State Television and vote for main right-wing and left-wing parties in villages where barely television signals penetrate 
          Vote Share for the right-wing party Vote Share for the left-wing party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Justice Party  Justice Party  Justice 
Party  
Republican 
People’s Party  
Republican 
People’s 
Party  
Republican 
People’s Party  
       
Television available -1.960 -0.939 -2.289 1.749 0.983 1.945 
 (4.614) (4.671) (3.976) (3.954) (4.112) (4.239) 
Post -7.571 -8.740 -6.732 4.846 5.675 5.742 
 (5.222) (5.323) (5.149) (4.328) (4.516) (4.345) 
Television*Post 3.863 4.072 3.922 0.679 0.496 0.404 
 (6.041) (6.039) (4.892) (5.485) (5.555) (4.527) 
Constant 48.403*** 33.684*** 57.420*** 27.005*** 37.390*** 38.543*** 
 (4.057) (9.391) (16.087) (3.325) (10.412) (12.838) 
Village fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Census Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438 
R-squared 0.020 0.041 0.760 0.023 0.035 0.774 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of eligible voters. This sample includes villages 
close to the signal penetration border which is presented by Figure 1. We include population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 
years old as control variables The standard errors in brackets are clustered by provinces, allowing for correlation between villages in the same 
province. Robust standard errors in parentheses, significant levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Turkish State Television and vote for main right-wing and left-wing parties in villages where barely 
television signals penetrate. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voter Turnout Voter Turnout Voter Turnout 
    
Television Available -5.463* -5.375* -5.567* 
 (3.241) (3.156) (3.628) 
Post 6.427** 6.756** 7.146** 
 (2.983) (2.943) (2.859) 
Television*Post -1.010 -0.744 -0.389 
 (3.977) (3.940) (3.494) 
Constant 81.158*** 85.798*** 87.551*** 
 (2.533) (3.575) (4.025) 
    
Village fixed effects No No Yes 
Census Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 438 438 438 
R-squared 0.073 0.095 0.725 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS with the observation weighted by the number of 
eligible voters. This sample includes villages close to the signal penetration border which is presented 
by Figure 1. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by provinces, allowing for correlation 
between villages in the same province. Robust standard errors in parentheses, significant levels at *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Placebo Tests for the election 1961 and 1965 when there were no television signal in Turkey 
       Vote Share for the right-wing party Vote Share for the left-wing party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Justice Party  Justice Party  Justice Party  Republican 
People’s Party  
Republican 
People’s Party  
Republican 
People’s Party  
       
Television available 4.917 4.069 1.301 3.230** 3.543*** 2.908 
 (5.163) (5.340) (3.095) (1.183) (1.121) (1.735) 
Post (1965) 17.914*** 17.882*** 17.969*** -9.124*** -9.113*** -9.100*** 
 (3.786) (3.807) (3.899) (1.205) (1.203) (1.232) 
Television*Post -4.389 -4.510 -4.445 0.849 0.891 0.887 
 (3.594) (3.557) (3.690) (1.398) (1.405) (1.436) 
Constant 34.197*** 33.250*** 35.716*** 37.145*** 37.520*** 37.689*** 
 (5.213) (5.203) (2.168) (1.142) (1.268) (1.070) 
       
Province fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Census and Geographic 
Controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.175 0.179 0.628 0.231 0.234 0.358 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS method using the election outcomes in 1961 and 1965 when Turkey has not been introduced by television 
broadcasting in the country. This baseline sample includes only the provinces which at least one county penetrated by television signal. We include population, 
urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 years old as control variables. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for 
correlation between districts in the same province. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Placebo test using election results in 1961 and 1965 when there is no television in Turkey 
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voter Turnout Voter Turnout Voter Turnout 
    
Television Available -0.479 0.440 1.176 
 (1.443) (1.303) (0.847) 
Post -9.981*** -9.948*** -9.939*** 
 (0.950) (0.947) (0.970) 
Television*Post 0.159 0.276 0.312 
 (0.927) (0.918) (0.937) 
Constant 82.774*** 83.923*** 83.672*** 
 (0.862) (0.941) (0.554) 
    
Province fixed effects No No Yes 
Census and geographic 
controls 
No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.334 0.370 0.609 
Notes: This specification reports the results of OLS method using the election outcomes in 1961 and 1965 
when Turkey has not been introduced by television broadcasting in the country. This baseline sample 
includes only the provinces which at least one county penetrated by television signal. We include 
population, urban ratio, gender ratio, and population over 18 years old as control variables. The standard 
errors in brackets are clustered by province, allowing for correlation between districts in the same 
province. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Technical Features and Coverage Information of Transmitters in 1970s 
Main 
stations 
Power 
(Kw) 
Coverage area Coverage Population 
 
Introduction 
Year  
  Km2 % (Thousand 
people) 
%  
Ankara 5 1250 0.2 1210 3.4 1968 
Istanbul 100 9000 1.2 3115 3.6 1972 
Izmir 100 20535 2.6 2082 5.8 1973 
Eskisehir 100 30600 3.9 1200 3.3 1974 
Adana 30 17000 2.2 1546 4.3 1974 
Edirne 30 16500 2.1 800 2.2 1974 
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Table 10: The development of television receivers in Turkey per years 
Year Total number of         
television receivers 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
3279 
102152 
121537 
212788 
357668 
472216 
 
Source : PTT Statistic and Research Department via  (Aziz, A. 1975) 
 
 
 
Table 11: The number of receivers in 3 big cities 
Cities\Year 1971 1972 1973 1975 
Ankara 59.043 67.257 74.389 95.770 
Istanbul 32.149 67.195 92.596 204.053 
Izmir 4.333 14.150 21.679 55.933 
Source : Uygur Kocabasoglu (1973) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Does Partisan Alignment Affect The 
Allocation of Intergovernmental 
Grants? Empirical Evidence from 
Turkish Municipalities 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The traditional literature on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers argues that 
grants should be allocated to municipalities or local governments in order to foster 
development by considering efficiency and equity criteria. For instance a welfare 
maximising government may wish to transfer money from richer regions to poorer 
using lump-sum grants. However, for political reasons this argument may not match 
the reality of what has happened in countries.  
The principles of apportionment of grants to municipalities are explained in the Law 
in Turkey. According to this law, apportionment shall be distributed to the 
municipalities according to the population of municipalities
6
. Nadaroğlu, H. and R. 
Keleş (1991) argue that those allocation criteria are subjective and not clear. 
Therefore this statement might have left the door open for political competition. This 
                                                 
6
 As of 2008, Law 5779 states that apportionment to municipalities according to the rates indicated 
in Article 2, 80 percent shall be distributed by the Bank of Provinces to the municipalities according 
to the population of municipalities and 20 percent according to the development index. 
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means that the government attempted to take into account both objective and 
economic factors such as regional income levels and socio-economic factors. Many 
scholars argue that grants are allocated to localities to increase the probability of re-
election of the incumbent or to increase votes in the next election (Grossman, P. J. 
1994, Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder Jr 1995) (Arulampalam, W., S. Dasgupta, A. 
Dhillon and B. Dutta 2009) (Johansson, E. 2003) (Brollo, F. and T. Nannicini 2012) 
(Bracco, E., F. Porcelli and M. Redoano 2013).  
In this chapter, I analyse grant allocation in Turkey to test empirically the hypothesis 
that municipalities aligned with central government (i.e. controlled by the same 
party) will receive more grant than those that are unaligned.  
I use a rich and new database for Turkish municipalities, which provide information 
on grants received by nearly 3200 municipalities during the period 1997–2005, from 
two different upper-tier governments (Central and Municipality level). This database 
helps us to overcome data quality problems encountered by other authors trying to 
test the alignment hypothesis. Firstly, in our database, there is cross section variation 
in the partisan control in two of the upper-layer governments (Central and 
Municipality level). 
Secondly, since there are three election outcomes during the period, we have enough 
within-municipality variation in partisan alignment (due to changes in partisan 
control at all layers of government) to provide reliable regression discontinuity 
design estimates of the effect of alignment on the amount of grants coming from 
each source. In the sample, there are also different central governments while the 
local ones don’t change.  Another important factor during this period is that Turkey 
witnessed a post-modern coup in 28 February 1997. In 1997 the military generals 
issued some decisions of a National Security Council meeting. This process 
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precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare 
Party and the end of his coalition government with True Path Party (Dogru Yol 
Partisi (DYP)).  
Following the military memorandum, Erbakan, the Prime Minister, was forced to 
resign. Although DYP, RP and BBP declared that they should form the new 
government under the prime-ministership of Tansu Ciller, the leader of DYP, the 
President appointed the ANAP leader, Mesut Yilmaz, to form the new government. 
He formed a new coalition government with Bulent Ecevit (the DSP leader) and 
Husamettin Cindoruk  (the founder and the leader of the DTP, a party founded after 
the 28th February Process by former DYP members) on 30 June 1997. The Welfare 
Party was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998.  
As a result of these vital events in Turkey, the central government changed at the 
upper level without a general election, while there was no change at local level, since 
the local elections were going to be held in 1999, two years later. Therefore we have 
enough within-municipality variation from the changes at central level. Hence the 
party or coalition government might have favoured the municipalities who are 
aligned with the same party.  
My empirical strategy to identify the alignment effects on grants and fiscal variables 
uses a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Basically, I compare municipalities 
where the elected mayor is just aligned with central governments with ones where 
the mayor is just not aligned. RDD reveal the results from barely won and barely lost 
municipalities. Using this design, I find that, if a municipality is politically aligned 
with the same party in central government, it will be allocated an extra 6.9 Turkish 
Lira per capita in grants. Although alignment seems to reduce the tax burden of 
residents and increase expenditure on public goods per capita, it is not statistically 
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significant. Therefore we cannot mention anything related to municipal revenues and 
expenditure. However, this may suggest that our specification is robust so that we 
only find evidence for the alignment effect for grants, not the other variables. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses briefly fiscal 
decentralization. Section 4 presents the structure of local public finance of 
municipalities in Turkey. Section 5 briefly introduces Turkish political system. 
Section 6 discusses the related literature. Section 7 presents data description and 
econometric strategy. Section 8 discusses the main empirical results on grants and 
local expenditure and income. Section 9 illustrates the graphical analysis and Section 
10 concludes the chapter.       
2.2. Fiscal Decentralisation in Theory 
Decentralisation is defined from different perspectives in the public choice literature, 
however most focuses on the same thing, which is dispersing or distributing power 
from the centre to the localities. In more detail, it can also be defined as the transfer 
of responsibility for management, planning, resource raising and allocation from 
central government to local or regional administration (Rondinelli, D., J. R. Nellis 
and G. S. Cheema 1983) 
In a broad sense, fiscal decentralisation is central government abandoning its fiscal 
controls to subnational governments. According to advocates of fiscal 
decentralisation, giving responsibility and fiscal power to lower levels of 
government can increase economic efficiency since governments at local level have 
more information about citizens. Hence, this shift will increase the efficiency of 
resource allocation. In other words, subnational governments whose responsibility is 
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to closely meet local needs are in a more available position to provide the public 
goods and services (Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu 2000).  
2.1. Objectives of Decentralisation 
It has been expressed that decentralisation will reduce burden and congestion in the 
channels of administration and communication. Therefore it is expected that delays 
will be reduced. 
There are also some political advantages of decentralisation such as power-sharing 
between the centre and localities and the promotion of democracy. (Wolman, H. 
1990) argues that decentralisation stimulates greater responsiveness of policy makers 
to the will of the citizens. He also states that decentralisation improves democratic 
values and provides the opportunity for people to discuss issues at the local level.  
2.2. Economic advantages of decentralisation 
As the main topic of this paper is the determinants of grant allocation in Turkey, it is 
worth discussing the economic advantages of decentralisation because revenue 
sharing is the result of decentralisation. In this sense, distribution, stabilisation and 
allocation can be counted as the fiscal functions of government (Musgrave, R. and P. 
Musgrave) 
The role of local governments in allocation, among those mentioned above, has been 
seen as substantial and it is argued that the efficiency of resource allocation is 
maximised under highly decentralised political structures. The argument that 
decentralisation may facilitate allocation efficiency proceeds on the following 
grounds (Sagbas, I. and M. Bagdigen 2003). 
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Decentralisation is more suitable to accommodate diversity. In public life, different 
groups of citizens have different preferences, needs and desires. For instance, for 
people living in warmer areas, air conditioning may be crucial whereas some people 
who live in poorer regions may find no need for it. Homelessness is a largely urban 
problem, while transportation is more likely to be a major need in rural areas 
(Ulbrich, H. H. 2011). 
Local authorities are better positioned than central governments to overcome 
informational and perceptual obstacles. In a decentralised structure, local authorities 
can easily reach communities whose preferences are different. By allowing citizens 
to make different choices in different communities, they become possible to 
accommodate.  
Decentralisation also leads to competition among local governments. This 
competition between regions was first mentioned by regional economist Charles 
Tiebout (Tiebout, C. M. 1956). The logic of Tiebout’s concept was based on the 
assumption that both workers and firms are mobile while they participate in self-
interested decision-making processes. They can move from one community to 
another, so that they can choose from several competing communities that offer the 
best tax and service packages that suit them. Communities, in turn, try to obtain an 
optimal population that minimises the average cost of providing public goods and 
services. Therefore people will gather in communities with tastes and preferences for 
public services and taxes that are relatively homogenous (Ulbrich, H. H. 2011).  
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2.3. Intergovernmental Grants 
A government may be federal or unitary; however there are always fiscal interactions 
between levels of government. As explained above, these fiscal linkages arise from 
shared responsibilities for programmes and services. In order to maintain the cost of 
these programmes or services, upper level governments transfer funds to lower level 
governments that are primarily responsible for providing services. Such transfers are 
called intergovernmental grants.  
Lower level governments do not have to raise all the revenue to fund their 
programmes and services thanks to the allocation of grants. For instance, 
intergovernmental grants make up almost 50% of total budget revenues of 
municipalities in Turkey. This large amount of money, transferred from the central 
government, allows local government to provide more public goods without thinking 
about the funding or levying new taxes. 
Although there is a normative theory of intergovernmental grants, empirical and 
practical applications imply that ideology and political motivation play an important 
role in the design of policy.  
The main aims of intergovernmental grants are (Oates, W. E. 1999): 
1. The internalisation of spill-over benefits to other jurisdictions 
2. Fiscal equalisation across jurisdictions 
3. Equitable and efficient tax systems via revenue sharing between central and 
decentralised governments. 
The forms of intergovernmental transfers can be classified in two main categories: a) 
revenue sharing, and b) grants. The main difference between these two forms is due 
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to their allocation methods. In revenue sharing, collected revenues are shared 
between the centre and local authorities in a fixed proportion. Local taxes or central 
taxes may be the source of these revenues. However grants are directly allocated by 
central governments, disregarding the central government’s revenue collection yield 
(Sagbas, I. and M. Bagdigen 2003).  
In Turkey, revenue sharing, which is the most common type of intergovernmental 
transfer in developing countries, has prevailed. It is distributed according to a set of 
criteria including population, the development index of a region and whether the 
municipality is metropolitan. In the period of interest of this paper (1997-2005), a 
population-based or per-capita scheme was implemented in the revenue sharing 
system.    
2.3.1. Explaining intergovernmental grants  
There are two main competing theories regarding the determinants of grants in a 
local public system.  
2.3.1.1. Efficiency and equalisation model 
According to this theory the allocation of grants to local government is based on the 
assumption of efficiency and equalisation. The efficiency and equalisation model 
(EEM) thinks of intergovernmental transfers as a policy tool of benevolent 
government. The existence and necessity of intergovernmental grants as a tool of 
benevolent government is inevitable once the government functions are split to 
different levels of government. The economic justification for grants assumes that 
central government may attempt to close any gaps between the revenue-raising 
capacities of cities and the cost differentials in the provision of publicly provided 
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goods and services. In turn, closing these gaps helps central government to achieve a 
minimum level of services across municipalities (Tekeli, R. and M. Kaplan 2008). 
2.3.1.2. The Public Choice Approach 
Beside the fact that a grant may be used as an economic device, some argue that this 
kind of central assistance might sometimes be provided with political motivation. 
Intergovernmental grants are part of the relationship between money spending and 
votes at an election ((Alperovich, G. 1984) (Bungey, M., P. Grossman and P. 
Kenyon 1991) (Faith, R. L. 1979) (Grossman, P. J. 1989) (Holcombe, R. G. and A. 
Zardkoohi 1981) (Rich, M. J. 1989)) . The process of grant allocation can be 
explained, at least partly, by factors associated with political interests forming the 
second view based on the PCA. Bungey, M., P. Grossman and P. Kenyon (1991) 
stated that the public choice approach argues that politicians, whose aim is to 
maximise the probability of staying in power, will use intergovernmental grants. In 
this approach, the importance of the possibility of vote trading and bargaining in the 
political marketplace is stressed.  
It is clear that a grant can provide many advantages to the recipient. For example, the 
recipient can provide more local services without imposing new taxes or raising 
existing tax rates, and local government can even reduce its own tax rates without 
reducing local spending. But here the question that is supposed to be asked is, why 
do politicians at the central level transfer resources to local government? It has been 
argued that the behaviour of governments in the democratic process is a result of 
efforts to maximise the probability of re-election.   
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2.4. Local Governments in Turkey 
Turkey is divided into provinces on the basis of geographical situation, economic 
conditions and public service requirements; provinces are further divided into lower 
level administrative entities according to their population sizes, such as districts or 
townships. In each district and township there are urban settlements, which are called 
municipalities. As of 2012, there are 81 provinces and around 2950 municipalities in 
Turkey. Table 1 shows the number of municipalities by their type in Turkey. 
According to table 1, Turkey have 16 Metropolitan, 143 metropolitan district, 65 
provincial, 749 district and 1977 town municipalities. About two thirds of all 
municipalities are formed by township municipalities, where more than 2000 
inhabitants live, according to the latest population census. Each municipality is 
established to meet the common needs of inhabitants living within the municipal 
borders. The mayor and municipal council, which is the decision-making organ of 
the municipality, are acceded in the elections.  
Table 1: Numbers of Municipalities by Type 
Municipalities  Count 
Metropolitan Municipality
7
 16 
Metropolitan District Municipality 143 
Provincial Municipality 65 
District Municipality 749 
Town Municipality 1977 
Total 2950 
Source: Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Local Governments 
                                                 
7
 As of November 2012, a draft law to restructure municipalities, such that 13 provinces with 
populations exceeding 750.000 will gain “metropolitan municipality status”, was approved by 
Parliament. 
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The head of the municipal administration is the mayor and he/she represents its legal 
personality. The mayor is elected by the public for a period of five years. The 
municipal councils are also elected for five years and vary in size according to each 
town`s population. They decide issues such as budgets, housing plans, reconstruction 
programmes, tax rates and fees which are essential for municipal services.  
2.4.1. Revenues 
The revenues of municipalities comprise their own revenues, shares from state tax 
revenues, state aid and other revenues. About half of the total revenues come from 
the share of state tax revenues.  Table 2 demonstrates the main components of the 
municipal revenue, as of 2010, in Turkey. It is clearly seen from table 2 that shares 
received from the General Budget Tax Revenues forms the main income for the 
municipalities in Turkey.  
Table 2: Municipal Revenues 
Types of Revenues Thousand TL % 
Shares Received from the General Budget Tax 
Revenues 
17,333,265 50.6 
Tax Revenues 5,854,566 17.1 
Enterprise and Ownership Revenues 4,824,058 14.1 
Interests, Shares and Fines 3,075,067 9.0 
Capital Revenues 2,533,815 7.4 
Other Revenues 613,092 1.8 
Total Revenues 34,233,863 100 
Source: General Activity Report of Local Authorities, 2010 
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Table 3 shows municipalities’ own revenues and their ratio to total revenues, which 
is the sum of the allocated tax and other revenues from the central budget. In total 
48.8% of their revenues are generated from their own municipal budget. However 
metropolitan municipalities are much more dependent on the revenues allocated by 
central government, such that only 34.9% of their total revenues comprise own 
revenues.  
Table 3: Revenues by Type of Municipality 
Type Own Revenues Total Revenues % 
Metropolitan Municipalities  4,650,915 13,322,111 34.9 
Provincial Municipalities 2,106,546 3,872,328 54.4 
District and Township 
Municipalities 
9,953,330 17,039,424 58.4 
Total 16,710,791 34,233,863 48.8 
Source: General Activity Report of Local Authorities, 2010 
According to Law No.5779, 2.85% of the total amount of budget tax revenues 
collected must be allocated to municipalities, conditional on their population, 
through The Bank of Provinces, which is the organisation responsible for the 
allocation of credits and grant to the local governments in Turkey. The Bank of 
Provinces distributes the share to municipalities as follows:  
 80% according to the population of municipalities 
 20% according to inter-municipal disparities in terms of development 
(Local Authorities in Turkey, 2011, accessed 06.12.2012) 
Here again, It is necessary to stress that the only criteria used to allocate grants to the 
municipalities was population during the period of our analysis.  
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2.4.1.1. Municipal Revenues 
39% of total municipal revenues come from revenues raised locally although the tax 
rates and fees are almost exclusively centrally determined.  
Municipalities’ revenues are derived from different sources and can be divided into 
three main groups; tax revenues, revenues other than taxes and aid and funds. Tax 
revenues cover the shares received from general budget tax revenues, municipal 
taxes and municipal duties. Municipal taxes come directly from several sources. 
These taxes are mainly property taxes, environment cleanliness taxes and other 
municipal taxes including fire insurance taxes, and advertisement and notification 
taxes. In addition some other own resources, called duties, are levied from local 
residents such as street lightning duty, work at the weekend and on holiday duty, and 
mineral water duty.  
2.4.1.2. Central Government Transfers 
Central government transfers to municipalities account for about 2% of GNP and 
correspond to around 50% of the municipalities revenues. The transfers are made 
through three mechanisms: 6% of national taxes are allocated to the municipalities 
according to population levels (55% of transfers); 4.1% of taxes collected within the 
province of a metropolitan municipality are transferred back to the metropolitan 
municipality (30% of transfers); and there are transfers through special government 
programs (15% of transfers). 
The official budget size of municipal governments is about 4-6% of GDP, which is 
on par with many European countries. The largest share of revenues is made up of 
transfers (grants) from the central government, while property taxes are one of a few 
locally determined sources of revenues. Transfers are largely determined by 
61 
 
population and whether a municipality is a district or province centre (Worldbank 
2004). The central government has left local public services and urban development 
(building permits) as the responsibility of the municipal mayor.  
Albeit that population is a criterion for distribution of national taxes (grants) to 
municipalities, money given by the central government is largely a political 
allocation of central resources. The relationship between a municipality and central 
government may play an important role in a process of political competition for 
resources and power. Central government is often keen to allocate more funds to 
municipalities governed by the same political party (Sagbas, I. and M. Bagdigen 
2003)  
2.4.2. Municipal Spending 
As with every entity in economics a municipality has budget constraint, spending 
their revenues collected in a year. So a municipalities’ spending is bound to the limit 
of its revenues. If the expenditure of any municipality exceeds its revenues, the only 
way to overcome it is by borrowing money. Therefore two components of a 
municipal budget are domestic and foreign borrowings.   
Municipal borrowings for investment have been limited to either loan from Iller 
Bank or the use of the Treasure Guarantee System (TGS) to access loans from 
international financial institutions for larger municipalities. According to the 
estimates, 85% of total debt, including to Treasury, Iller Bank, tax and social 
security offices is not serviced since municipalities have failed to keep up their 
payments. Metropolitan municipalities are the ones who have more debt to Treasury. 
Most foreign loans made to municipalities arise from International Financial 
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Institutions, such as World Bank, European Investment Bank for the infrastructure 
investments. Treasury guarantees the loans  typically made to municipalities.  
TGS facilitates large municipalities to access foreign credits. As of 2004, The US$ 
3.7 billion outstanding to Treasury represents municipalities’ debt to Treasury after 
guarantees were invoked and Treasury paid creditors, on Municipalities behalf 
(World Bank, 2004). 
Municipalities have shown irresponsible stance during 90s to repay loans due to the 
expectations of that Treasury will wipe out debts. Therefore central government has 
put an upper-limit to municipal borrowing under Treasury guarantees. Borrowing 
has also become subject to a permission of Treasury.  
To argue that municipalities face a balanced budget is difficult in this sense. They 
face a soft budget constraint in the sense that a municipality expects an additional 
subsidy if it experiences financial difficulty. More recently, the problem of soft 
budget constraints has become an issue in intergovernmental relations. The problem 
arises because, with decentralization, the central government has limited control over 
sub-national government spending and borrowing, but it maintains a strong interest 
in the affairs of lower-level governments. Hence, soft budget constraint arise when 
sub-national governments perceive that they will receive additional resources from 
the central government in the case of financial difficulty. This perception leads 
subnational governments to behave strategically in selecting spending and borrowing 
levels, and this may precipitate requesting more resources from the central 
government (Vigneault, M. L. 2005). However in Turkey, municipalities are not 
fully independent and are audited by the Turkish Courts of Accounts (Sayistay). 
Borrowing for municipality is not unlimited and subject to some rules. For instance, 
according to Law 4749, a municipality can borrow from abroad only for some 
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investment projects that is clearly specified in investment program. They cannot 
receive foreign loans for current spending.  Upper limit for a municipality to borrow 
are calculated as follows; the total debt stock including interest payments cannot 
exceed the total budget revenue of the last final account year considering 
revaluation, that is a number used in Turkish account system for an inflation rate. 
This borrowing limit is multiplied by 1.5 for metropolitan municipalities (DOĞAN, 
M. and A. İ. BAŞ 2013).        
2.5. Turkish Political System or Local Government Electoral 
System in Turkey 
Local administration in Turkey is composed of three administrative and political 
layers; precincts and villages, municipalities, and provincial administrations. The 
municipalities are locally elected bodies. Provincial administration in Turkey is 
organised by a provincial council, elected by popular vote, for a period of 5 years, 
and an executive committee, elected by the provincial council and headed by a 
governor. Governors are civil servants appointed by the central government in 
Ankara. They act as the representatives of the state. The elections for the provincial 
councils are run based on the proportional representation (PR) system and are held 
simultaneously with the municipal electoral contests (Incioglu, N. 2002). Except for 
the sixteen provinces with metropolitan municipalities, the electoral districts for 
provincial council elections are the same as those used for the parliamentary 
elections. In three provinces (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir), there are several electoral 
districts in parliamentary elections but only one for the provincial council elections. 
Although provincial councils in Turkey are empowered with large formal functions 
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and responsibilities, in fact the actual powers and actions of the provincial 
administrations are quite limited.     
Around 80% of municipalities have a population of fewer than 10,000. Both the 
mayors and the members of the municipal councils are elected by the voters for five-
year terms. The municipal executive committees are headed by the mayors and they 
include members elected by the municipal councils and appointed members from the 
staff of the municipal administration (Incioglu, 2002). 
The importance of the Turkish local administrative system has increased as a result 
of migration to the cities from the rural areas in Anatolia, particularly after 1980. 
Currently about 65% of the population lives in urban areas and this is expected to 
increase further in the future. Although the pressures regarding urbanisation have 
been high, Turkey has maintained urban services to its citizens. Overall coverage of 
transport, water and solid waste management is high and, per capita, municipal 
spending has increased over time.   
Considering the large concentration of voters in urban areas due to the 
aforementioned reasons, political parties have increasingly noticed that local 
elections are crucial in order to expand their electoral popularity in the national 
elections. Winning the mayoral seats in municipalities provides a party a substantial 
political influence and visibility in national politics. It is also argued that the party 
may reach for new sources of political patronage (municipal jobs, short or long term 
contracts for investment etc.) that can generate new activists via recruitment, and 
supporters in the future (Incioglu, N. 2002). The Welfare Party, RP (Refah Party), an 
Islamist party, is a good example of this. The RP won the mayoral elections in two 
of three biggest metropolitan cities (Istanbul and Ankara) in 1994 and then in 1995 
they became the largest party at a general election with a share of 21.37% of the total 
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votes. This success of RP in general elections is linked to their popularity in the local 
elections, held just one year before.  
The organisational structure of the municipalities differs according to whether they 
are metropolitan or not. There is a two-tier system called “The Greater City 
Municipality (Buyuksehir Belediyesi)” in 16 metropolitan cities8.  The lower tier 
includes a number of district municipalities that are responsible for the provision of 
basic municipal services in their areas of administration. They are headed by district 
mayors. The upper tier is responsible for implementing large projects such as 
strategic planning and investment, transportation networks and major public 
facilities. These Upper City Municipalities are governed by metropolitan mayors. A 
proportional representation electoral system is used in the elections. Mayoral races, 
both at the Upper City and the district levels, are run through the use of the plurality 
electoral formula.   
Unlike national elections, which are proportional and include restrictions on minority 
representation, local mayoral elections are determined by single-round plurality 
elections which allow the use of RD design
9
.  
2.5.1. Gaining Strength of Islamic Parties in the 1990s 
Although there have been Islamic Parties on the Turkish political scene since the 
1960`s (National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), Felicity 
Party (Saadet Partisi) and more recently The Justice and Development Party (AK  
                                                 
8
 These cities are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Konya, Mersin, Kayseri, Eskisehir, 
Diyarbakir, Antalya, Samsun, Izmit, Erzurum and Sakarya.  
9
 In order for a party to be in parliament, it has to receive at least ten per cent of the national vote. 
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Table 4: Changes in the Political Spectrum 
 1994 Local 
Elections 
1999 Local Elections 2004 Local Elections 
Right wing 
votes (%) and 
number of 
municipalities 
they won 
ANAP  22,97 793 FP 18,40 488 AK 
PARTY 
40,18 1778 
DYP 18,90 886 ANAP 17,43 779 MHP 10,12 248 
MHP 7,51 118 MHP 15,14 499 DYP 9,45 382 
RP 19,07 329 DYP 12,75 736 SP 4,78 60 
BBP 0,94 11 BBP 1,22 25 ANAP 2,96 101 
DP 0,32 6 BP 0,16 6 BBP 0,63 12 
 DP 0,13 4 GENC 
PARTY 
2,41 13 
Left wing  
votes (%) and 
number of 
municipalities 
they won 
CHP 4,36 64 DSP 15,19 189 CHP 20,70 473 
DSP 7,87 23 CHP 13,83 373 SHP 4,75 67 
SHP 16,70 436 HADEP 3,37 38 DSP 1,95 31 
Independents 
and number 
of 
municipalities 
they won 
 0,78 44  0,65 61  1,03 55 
Source : Author’s own calculations and yerelnet.org.tr (TODAIE), website supported by Ministry of 
Development, Republic of Turkey.   
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Party)) their vote shares did not exceed 12%, and they did not show a significant 
vote share in local and general elections until the 1990s. Following the 1994 local 
elections, political Islam found a lot of support in industrialised and urban areas.  
Table 4 demonstrates the changes in the political spectrum in local elections between 
1994 and 2004. Through the multi-party era the total votes have been around 30% 
for the left wing parties and around 70% for the right. While central right parties, 
DYP and ANAP, led the election races in 1994, the Islamist party Refah Party, RP, 
showed great success too. RP became the second party, winning 2 metropolitan 
cities, Istanbul and Ankara, together with 329 municipalities across the entire 
country.  RP won 19% of the vote in the 1994 local elections and 21.4% of the 
national vote in the 1995 general elections.   
Table 4 also illustrates that the number of municipalities which the Islamist Parties 
hold increased in the 1999 local elections reaching 488, from 329. Once again the 
Fazilet Party (Virtue Party) was banned by the Constitutional Court, the AK Party 
which was formed after that, gained 1778 municipalities in the 2004 local elections. 
AK Party became the winning party, achieving 40,78% of the vote in the elections.  
Another prominent thing shown in Table 4 is that the dominant parties in local 
elections changed significantly between 1994 and 2004. In terms of the alignment 
issue of the municipalities with the parties in central government, we also need to 
look at the replacements in the central tier. Since the municipality grants data used in 
this paper cover years between 1997 and 2005, we show the picture of the Turkish 
political arena in this period.  
The construction of how municipalities were aligned and which party or parties were 
in power between 1997 and 2005 is as follows. 
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2.5.1.1. Refah Party  
Since RP was the winner of the general election in 1995, RP established a coalition 
government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi, DYP), which lasted for 
only 11 months. The leader and Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned after 
the military intervention of February 28, 1997 (Atacan, F. 2005).  The constitutional 
court in Turkey decided to shut down the largest party in parliament, the pro-Islamist 
Welfare Party, for violating the principle of secularism in the constitution.  
The answer to the question of who voted for Islamic parties in the 1990s is given by 
Esmer (1995). Esmer argues that young, male voters living in rural areas were more 
likely than other people to vote for the RP (Refah Partisi), whereas women in urban 
areas, especially those gainfully employed were least prone to vote RP.  
Erder (1996) demonstrates that RP found relatively strong support from small 
farmers, low-scaled businessmen and industrial workers, to whom the leader of RP, 
Necmeddin Erbakan, pledged a “fair system” for all people in the country no matter 
who they are. However he received very little support from professionals and 
bureaucrats.  
The fact that the AK Party (AKP) has little support in cities where there is a growing 
tourism economy was also true for the previous Islamic parties, RP and FP (Fazilet 
Partisi). The performance of these parties was also poor in the 90s (Güneş-Ayata, A. 
2002). However the RP/FP performed well in Istanbul and Kocaeli, the two most 
highly industrialised provinces. (Kumbaracibasi, A. C. 2009) explains this by the 
fact that both provinces have enjoyed large numbers of migrants from all over the 
country.  
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2.6. Literature Review on parties and Economic Outcomes 
New deal spending in the United States is a good example of how politics matter for 
the allocation of governmental resources across regions. During the 1930s, people 
realised that money that was expected to go to the poor south had been transferred to 
the already wealthy states in the west
10
. In order to understand this pattern, 
researchers started to think that political variables may play a role, alongside 
economic variables, that could explain the allocation of New Deal spending. Wright, 
G. (1974), for example, found a noticeably higher coefficient of determination in the 
political regression than in the economic regression, when running cross section 
estimations for the period 1933-1940 on 48 states. These regressions are based on a 
theoretical model where the president maximises the probability of winning and 
where voters are positively sensitive to new spending programmes. 
Using panel data techniques, Wallis, J. J. (1996) also found that economic variables 
did matter and that excluding Nevada
11
 from the sample, Wright’s presidential 
variables are still significant in the regression.   
(Pettersson‐Lidbom, P. 2008) seek an answer to the question of to what extent party 
control in local governments determines fiscal and economic policies. He uses a 
regression-discontinuity method, which is applied to a panel data set from Swedish 
local governments, on which party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the 
vote share. According to his findings, there is a significant effect such that left wing 
parties spend and tax 2-3% more than right wing parties. In terms of employment, 
the political entities where left wing parties govern have 7% lower unemployment 
rates.  
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Arrington (1969) and Reading (1973) for an analysis of New Deal spending.  
11
 Nevada was the state receiving the largest per capita grants during the period.  
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In the political economics literature that investigates whether political parties have 
some effect on economic variables, the studies have generally focused on states or 
countries. Ferreira, F. and J. Gyourko (2007) discuss cities in the US instead of 
states. They found that no matter whether the mayor is a Democrat or Republican, it 
does not influence the size of government or the distribution of local public 
spending. But they show that there is a significant political advantage for 
incumbents, in the next elections.  
Many papers have tested the hypothesis that municipalities controlled by the same 
party as upper-tier governments receive more grants than those that are controlled by 
other parties in opposition.   
Recently many papers have tested hypotheses which are derived from electoral 
competition models. These hypotheses concern the effects of political incentives on 
apportionment of grants. Many scholars argue that grants are allocated to localities to 
increase the probability of re-election chances of the incumbent or to increase votes 
in the next election (Grossman, 1994; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Dasgupta et al., 
2004; Johanson, 2003; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Bracco et al., 2012). For 
example, according to (Lindbeck, A. and J. W. Weibull 1987) and (Dixit, A. and J. 
Londregan 1998), upper-layer or central governments should transfer more grant to 
states in which there is a high proportion of voters who are not specifically linked to 
any of the parties (so called ‘swing voters’). Case, A. (2001) suggests that there is a 
positive, significant and robust relationship between bias in favour of the Democratic 
Party and the size of the commune’s block grant in Albania.  
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Sole-Olle, A. and P. Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use a rich Spanish database, which 
provides information on grants allocated to nearly 900 municipalities during the 
period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments. Benefitting from 
differences-in-differences estimation method, they suggest that partisan alignment 
has a sizeable effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities such that 
aligned municipalities enjoy 40% more grants than unaligned ones.   
Dahlberg, M. and E. Johansson (2002) take a temporary grant program in Sweden 
which differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects and 
examine whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these 
grants. They find that the incumbent government used the grant program in order to 
win votes. Parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. 
However they do not find any evidence that incumbent governments transfer more 
money to their own supporters.  
An alternative hypothesis found in the literature posits that, if politicians are risk 
averse, grants will be allocated to states where electors are evidently aligned to the 
incumbent party, called ‘core supporters’. 
Arulampalam et al. (2009) derived a testable prediction from the model of 
redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its 
preference in allocation of transfers to state governments. They test this prediction 
using Indian data for 14 states from 1974 to 1997 and find that a state which is both 
‘aligned’ and ‘swing’ in the last state election obtains more transfers than a state 
which is ‘unaligned’ and ‘non-swing’.  
As Sole-Olle, A. and P. Sorribas-Navarro (2008) point out, several papers, such as 
Levitt and Snyder (1995) for the USA, (Worthington, A. C. and B. E. Dollery 1998) 
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for Australia, (Khemani, S. 2003) for India, have tested this hypothesis in which 
aligned states receive more grants from upper-tier government. Grossman (1994), for 
instance, developed a model of vote-maximising federal politicians and tested this 
empirically using cross-sectional data for 49 states of the United States for the years 
1974, 1977, 1980 and 1983. According to the estimation results, similarity of party 
affiliation between federal and state politicians increases grants transferred to a state.  
Most of them confirmed that aligned states receive more funds. Sole-Olle et al. 
(2008) argue that most of these empirical papers include a common issue. The fact 
that the partisan control at the upper layer of government in the periods they 
examined does not change, leads to some doubt about robustness of the results.   
Therefore without change in control at the federal level, the democratic control at the 
state level might reveal other factors influencing the allocation of grants (e.g. more 
need in poor states controlled by the democrats); this problem is even more striking 
in that paper, since the analysis was performed with cross-sectional data. The same 
problematic issue can arise in the other papers, which use panel data but for time 
periods of unchanged partisan control at the national level (e.g. Khemani, 2003). 
Therefore, the main problem in these papers is that central government does not 
change during the years of study, so this weakens the correctness of the results. 
2.7. Data and Empirical Model 
The data set for our study consists of annual observations spanning the financial 
years from 1997 to 2005 for around 3000 municipalities of Turkey. Of these 3000 
municipalities, we have 16 metropolitan, 143 metropolitan district, 65 provincial, 
749 district and 1977 town municipalities where the population is mostly less than 
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5000 inhabitants. We exclude from our study the metropolitan municipalities that 
receive additional, “origin-based”, revenue shares. These are centrally determined 
taxes which are transferred back to their place of origin, that is, back to the 
jurisdiction from where they were collected (Sagbas, I. 2001). 
The grant variable that we use is defined as the per capita transfer at constant price 
(1998 Turkish Lira) from central government. All financial variables are deflated 
using The State Planning Organisation deflator.  
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for the variables used 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Grants (TL) 12590 566381 2158340 1021 476000000 
Grants per capita (real TL per 
capita) 
12590 13.89 27.95 0.84 2924.35 
Population 14116 22711 71024 318 990073 
Property Tax (real TL per 
capita) 
11451 6.26 19.59 10 569 
Population below 18 (%) 13140 36.94 24.95 25 53 
Local Expenditure (real TL per 
capita) 
14116 62.02 132.97 212 11183 
Local Income (real TL per 
capita) 
14116 53.89 169.65 192 16968 
Alignment Dummy 20357 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Alignment Margin 20357 -8.44 30.56 -100 100 
 
In Table 5, the observation, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximums for 
the variables used are given. All variables are in per capita terms and economic or 
fiscal variables are transformed to real terms using The State Planning Organisation 
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(SPO) deflator. Table 5 gives statistics for the full sample. According to Table 5, the 
mean of the alignment dummy is 0.38, in other words 38% of all municipalities in 
the regression sample are aligned to the central government. 
From an empirical view, every attempt to estimate the causal impact of political 
alignment on the amount of inter-governmental grant is clearly complicated by 
endogeneity issues. Without finding a credible source of exogenous variation in 
political alignment, the empirical correlation between alignment and grants may be 
entirely driven by socio-economic factors influencing both dimensions. To deal with 
this problem, we use Turkish data and adapt the regression discontinuity (RD) design 
for close electoral races, pioneered by (Lee, D. and T. Lemieux 2010).   
Regression discontinuity (RD) design has been used in a wide range of social science 
disciplines for many years. It has also been popular in economics recently, 
particularly in applied microeconomics, in order to exhibit treatment effect. The 
main motive of using RD design is to avoid the endogeneity problem which is 
commonly seen in econometrics. RD is a non-experimental setting where treatment 
is determined by whether an observed “assignment” variable exceeds a known cut-
off point (Lee, D. and T. Lemieux 2010).  
Panel estimation techniques, which control for year and fixed state effects, should 
make estimates less prone to omitted-variable bias than simple cross-sectional 
estimates. The effects of having an aligned mayor or an unaligned one can be better 
identified using regression-discontinuity estimators, which rely on data taken from 
candidates who win elections by small margins. Since such elections are presumably 
determined with some randomness, these estimators have quasi-experimental 
properties (Albouy, D. 2013). 
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The effect of partisan alignment on central government funding across municipalities 
is modelled empirically using a flexible control function for the vote share going to a 
mayor who is aligned (or non-aligned) with the central government party or 
coalition, to produce regression-discontinuity estimates, which improve 
identification.  
There are two types of RD design which are called Sharp and Fuzzy RD. In this 
paper I use Sharp RD which is used when treatment status is a deterministic and 
discontinuous function of covariate, 𝑥𝑖. Suppose for example, that 
      𝐷𝑖 = {
1       𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑥0
0       𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥0
   , 
where 𝑥0 is a known threshold or cut-off. This assignment mechanism is a 
deterministic function of 𝑥𝑖 since once we have got information about 𝑥𝑖 we know 
𝐷𝑖. Treatment is a discontinuous function of 𝑥𝑖 because no matter how much 𝑥𝑖 
converges to 𝑥0, treatment is not changed until 𝑥𝑖= 𝑥0 (D., A. J. and P. Jörn-Steffen 
2009).  
We can formalise RD in a simple model. If the potential outcome can be described 
by a linear, constant effect model; 
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 
                 𝑌1𝑖 = 𝑌0𝑖 + 𝜋 
The first equation above represents untreated outcome, 𝑌0𝑖, while the second is the 
treated outcome that includes treatment, 𝜋. If we combine these two statuses, we get 
this regression, 
     𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜋𝐷𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖, 
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where 𝜋 is the causal effect of interest. The crucial thing in RD is that 𝐷𝑖, the 
regressor of interest, is not only correlated with 𝑥𝑖, it is also a deterministic function 
of 𝑥𝑖. RD reveals causal effects by distinguishing the nonlinear and discontinuous 
function, 1 (𝑥𝑖>𝑥0), from the smooth and linear function, 𝑥𝑖.  
Following this approach, we would like to estimate the pure alignment effect on 
grants which are transferred by the central government every year. As shown in 
previous sections, grants play an important role in Turkey since they account for 
almost half of the total revenue of municipalities. In order to find the causal effect of 
alignment, we compare municipalities where the elected mayor is barely aligned 
with central government with those where the mayor is barely unaligned. Barely 
aligned means that the mayor won the election with a little margin and the mayor 
and the party in central government is the same.   
The model we estimate is the following form: 
 '0 1 1( )it i t it t it itY AL f MA X              (2.1) 
   
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 per capita grants for municipality i in time period t, 𝜇𝑖 is a municipality 
fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡 is a time-specific effect, 1itAL  is the alignment dummy taking the 
value of 1 if the ruling party at the municipality level is the same party as the party in 
power in the central government, this is our treatment indicator. 1( )tf MA   is a 
control function, i.e. the margin of alignment which is calculated as the difference 
between the vote share obtained by the candidate who is aligned with the central 
government and the second largest party in election in municipality i. In this way, the 
variable MA implies that all observations with a positive (negative) MA are 
municipalities which are aligned (unaligned) with the central government, and 
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observations close to 0 from each side refer to mayors who won or lost the elections 
with a very small margin. (i.e. If MA is negative (positive), it means the aligned 
candidate lost (won) the election).  
The control function 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) is some continuous function usually an n-order 
polynomial in the forcing variable on each side of the cut-off. The parameter of 
interest 0 , party alignment effect, measures the average difference in the amount of 
grants between aligned and unaligned municipalities. The main reason for including 
fixed municipality and time fixed effects is to enhance efficiency because there is no 
need to include additional covariates except for 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) in the model to get an 
unbiased estimate of 0 . 
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lemieux (2008) point out that the estimation method may be 
sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the threshold. As a 
robustness check, we address this fact and implement the local linear regression 
approach, which restricts the sample to municipalities in the interval  ,itMA h h    
, where h is optimally chosen bandwidth, and we follow the methodology suggested 
by (Imbens, G. and K. Kalyanaraman 2011)    
The alignment dummy variable is included in order to account for the political 
dimension in the process of grants allocation. While a zero coefficient of alignment 
would indicate that this process is free of political considerations, a significant 
coefficient, either positive or negative, would indicate the relevancy of political 
considerations in this allocation process.  
Essentially, the question is whether, in its attempt to maximise the prospects for re-
election, the government should pursue policies which reward its supporters or 
policies which reward its opponents. While theory indicates that the answer to this 
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question is complicated and depends crucially on the voting behaviour of the two 
groups, almost all researchers seem to believe that under the observed behaviour of 
voters in the U.S., governments seeking re-election should pursue policies which 
reward their supporters (Alperovic, 1984). 
2.8. Estimation Results 
In this section, we present the main empirical results of the alignment effect on fiscal 
policies (grants, local own revenues and, local current expenditures). The results are 
shown in Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. All tables are constructed on the same 
principle, such that tables have 6 columns of results that represent up to the 6
th
 
polynomial of the alignment margin variable. We follow AIC (Akaike information 
criterion) approach to select the best model. In practice we start with a set of 
candidate models’ corresponding AIC values. We rank the set of models according 
to AIC values and the model with the smallest AIC value is deemed the optimal 
model among the set of candidates. AIC values for each polynomial are also shown 
in the tables. Based upon AIC procedure, best model is 4
th
 polynomial with smallest 
AIC value. Table 6 displays the regression results for whether alignment to the party 
in central government affects grants transferred to the municipalities, without control 
variables. We present the regression results with and without control variables in 
different tables. We include these control variables in order to check whether the 
alignment status is as good as randomly assigned. The inclusion of these additional 
covariates should not have any impact if alignment status is as good as randomly 
assigned conditional on 𝑓(𝑀𝐴)12. We also report some standard information on the 
                                                 
12
 See PETTERSSON‐LIDBOM, P. (2008): "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression‐
Discontinuity Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 1037-1056. 
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specification, such as the number of observations and municipalities and R-squared. 
All specifications include time and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at municipal level, are reported in all specifications.  
Beginning with Table 6, the coefficient of interest (alignment variable) is always 
positive and statistically highly significant in all our specifications. According to 
these findings, we can clearly state that aligned municipalities enjoy more grants 
compared to non-aligned ones. The value of  0  changes between 2.569 and 4.978.  
For instance, using the specification with the 6
th
 polynomial form in the control 
function, being aligned with the party in central government leads to an additional 
4.511 Turkish Lira per capita in grants to the people living in that municipality. 
Table 7, which includes covariates, produces similar results. Following the choice of 
the best polynomial order, we conclude that municipalities that are politically aligned 
with the central government receive, on average for each individual, more grants for 
5.888 Turkish Liras. The specification with and without controls provide very 
similar results and this is consistent with the hypothesis that the inclusion of further 
controls becomes redundant thanks to the use of the control function.  
When we look at the results for municipal own revenue such as taxes or fees, shown 
in Table 8 and Table 9, we see that being aligned to the party in central government 
causes a municipality to collect less revenue than a non-aligned municipality in the 
second column. The coefficient is only statistically significant in the first polynomial 
and insignificant in the others. Although its sign is negative as we expected, it is not 
enough to imply anything.  
Table 10 and Table 11 present the results for municipality expenditures. We 
excluded personnel salary payment from this variable so that we get more sense in 
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terms of public finance literature that deals with public good provision
13
.By doing 
this, we focus on only expenditure on public good or services. Here again, the 
picture tells us that alignment does not statistically affect municipal expenditure. 
Here again, we did not consider to present AIC values for the regression results of 
municipality revenue and expenditure since the coefficients obtained from the 
regression are not statistically significant. None of the coefficients are statistically 
significant, however their sign is positive, most likely due to fact that aligned 
municipalities take more grants than non-aligned ones and hence they provide more 
public goods and services in their jurisdiction. The coefficient goes from -2.769 to 
5.928.      
All the results presented here allow us to conclude that aligned municipalities are 
awarded more grants from the central government in Turkey while they distress their 
residents less and might spend more compared to unaligned ones.  
The population variable is included in order to take into account possible economies 
of scale in the provision of services by local authorities. It is suggested in the 
literature that the average cost of providing such services decreases with city size. 
Thus, the inclusion of the population variable intends to capture government's grants 
policy concerning such economies. Accordingly, it is expected that the sign of 
population variable will be negative. The property tax variable is included in order to 
represent income level in each municipality.  
Due to development basis of municipalities or regions, the government should 
allocate grants to less developed or poor areas. In parallel to this fact, the coefficient 
of collected property tax income is positive and significant. A positive sign of this 
                                                 
13
 Even if we run the regression for all expenditures including personnel payments made in a 
municipality, our results do not change significantly.   
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variable indicates that the richer municipalities enjoy more grants than poor areas. 
This contradicts what is supposed to be, based on development reasons. Therefore 
we can argue that political considerations play an important role while grants are 
transferred to local authorities in Turkey.  
Table 12 shows the alignment effect on grants in municipalities where the winning 
margin is very close to zero. Columns report the same specification but with 
different margins of victory in the elections. Our empirical results show that, in razor 
close competitive elections where the alignment margin is very close to zero, 
municipalities with a mayor affiliated with the coalition of the Turkish government 
receive more grants than others. In parallel to the RD estimation spirit, we run the 
fixed effect regression for barely won elections by the mayor with margin 1%, 2%, 
3%, 4% and 5% respectively. According to the results shown in Table 12, the 
coefficient of the alignment dummy gets stronger as long as the alignment margin 
converges to 0. For example, municipalities who are aligned to the party at central 
level and win the election with 1% margin of votes, take 12.205 Turkish Lira more 
than those who are not aligned.  There are 256 municipalities in this position, with 
1% margin of victory. The magnitude of coefficient is 12.918 in 2% margin and 
8.755 in 3% margin. In the margin of 4 % and 5%, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant though its sign is still positive and the effect on grant allocation is 
smaller. This estimation provides us with a more robust result since the specification 
method used here is exactly what regression discontinuity asked for. In other words, 
we compare the municipalities where the mayor barely won the election and barely 
lost the election. 
This means that the central government allocates more grants to aligned 
municipalities where it believes that the competition is very high in those places and 
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aimed to increase its existing votes in the next election by transferring more money 
which can be used to produce more public goods or services.  
Finally, in the table 13, we report the results for the local linear regression model, 
where the sample is restricted to observations within an optimally chosen bandwidth, 
calculated following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). As a robustness check we 
also present results for when the sample is restricted to double as well as half the 
optimal bandwidth size. 
2.9. Graphical Analysis 
Graphical analysis is an integral part of RD analysis. Since the nature of RD design 
suggests that the treatment effect can be measured at the cut-off of the forcing 
variable, we should able to observe this reality in a graph. This will give us a 
powerful way to visualise the identification strategy. Therefore we follow the 
procedure of (Lee, D. and T. Lemieux 2010) and (Calonico, S., M. D. Cattaneo and 
R. Titiunik 2014)
14
. We especially use (Calonico, S., M. D. Cattaneo and R. Titiunik 
2014) command that implements a data-driven optimal length choice of evenly-
spaced bins used to approximate the underlying regression functions in RD 
estimation.  
Figures 1-7 show the graphs for the difference of percentage of votes between the 
party who are aligned with the central government and the unaligned one who is the 
runner-up (reported on the horizontal axis) in the election and the dependent 
variables used in the regression discontinuity analysis (reported on the vertical axis). 
                                                 
14
 All Regression Discontinuity graphs are visualized using rdbinselect command of CALONICO, S., M. D. 
CATTANEO, and R. TITIUNIK (2014): "Optimal Data-Driven Regression Discontinuity Plots," Working 
paper, University of Michigan. 
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This means that right half of the figure shows the municipalities aligned whereas left 
half of the figure shows the municipalities which are not aligned.  
All figures present the fitted values from a regression model estimated separately on 
each side of the cut-off point, using the polynomial of the forcing variable. We 
illustrated the graph according to the 4
th
 order polynomial, however all others are 
also visualised and we cannot see any apparent difference.  
Figure 1 show very clear evidence of discontinuity at the cut-off point where the 
dependent variable is intergovernmental grants per capita. One can easily see that 
there is jump just after the cut-off point that enables us to be safe in our analysis. 
Figures 2-4 also report that when we narrowed the margin of alignment to 1%, 2% 
and 3% respectively, we testify that the treatment effect is more robust in the 
municipalities where the election has been more competitive.  
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the case where the dependent variable is municipal own 
revenues and municipal expenditures respectively. We see that there is no 
discontinuity at the cut-off point. Actually this is the result that we should expect 
because the treatment variable is not significant in our regressions in the previous 
section.  
Finally, another crucial test for the validity of the RD design is to examine whether 
covariates do not exhibit any discontinuity at the cut-off point on the margin of 
victory. Figures 7 and 8 show no evidence of discontinuity at the cut-off, confirmed 
also by a formal RD regression using up to the 4
th
 order polynomial in the control 
function.   
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2.10. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence from across the world has shown several cases in which 
intergovernmental grants are affected by political motivations even though some 
governments have adopted some formulae for revenue sharing mechanisms. Turkey 
is one of the countries where intergovernmental grants are transferred to the 
municipalities according to population criteria. This paper explored whether there 
was political motivation of revenue sharing in Turkey. We also endeavoured to find 
an effect of alignment on municipal own revenues and expenditures. 
We tested these questions using a new, unique and first-time-used dataset of Turkish 
municipalities and elections between 1997 and 2005. We employed regression 
discontinuity design, allowing us to compare municipalities, aligned and non-aligned 
to central government, at local elections.  
In particular, we found that, if a municipality is politically aligned with the same 
party in central government, it will be allocated an extra 6.9 Turkish Lira per capita 
in grants. Although alignment seems to reduce the tax burden of residents and 
increase expenditure on public goods per capita, it is not statistically significant. 
Therefore we cannot mention anything related to municipal revenues and 
expenditure. However, this may suggest that our specification is robust so that we 
only find evidence for the alignment effect for grants, not the other variables.  
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       Table 6: The effect of alignment on grants without control variables 
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment 2.569*** 3.034*** 4.059*** 4.978*** 4.459*** 4.511*** 
 (0.306) (0.397) (0.509) (0.681) (0.728) (0.839) 
Constant 10.130*** 10.176*** 10.039*** 9.475*** 9.395*** 8.835*** 
 (0.333) (0.352) (0.377) (0.471) (0.521) (0.617) 
       
Observations 12,502 12,502 12,502 12,502 12,502 12,502 
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.056 
Notes: 1: Dependent variable is intergovernmental grant per capita in reel term. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for 
polynomials from 1
st
  to 6
th
. Municipality and year fixed effect included in regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered at the municipal level. Significant levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Table 7: The effect of alignment on grants with controls  
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment 3.853*** 3.782*** 4.367*** 5.888*** 5.900*** 6.919*** 
 (0.666) (0.647) (0.850) (1.430) (1.655) (2.594) 
Constant -3.620* -2.972 -3.223 -4.089** -4.170** -4.435** 
 (1.878) (2.094) (1.973) (1.779) (1.742) (1.771) 
       
Observations 10,526 10,526 10,526 10,526 10,526 10,526 
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.165 
       
AIC value 92890.46 92894.28 92893.56 92890.18 92896.32 92899.09 
Notes: 2: Dependent variable is intergovernmental grant per capita in reel term. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for 
polynomials from 1
st
 to 6
th
. Municipality and year fixed effect included in regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered at the municipal level. AIC values are given to choose optimal polynomial, which is the 4
th
. Control variables include 
population, population under 18, property tax per capita as a proxy for local income, male ratio. Significant levels are *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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        Table 8: The effect of alignment on Municipal Own Revenues without controls 
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment -12.756* -3.487 5.742 -1.285 -8.517 -4.520 
 (6.938) (8.498) (10.767) (17.297) (22.418) (18.919) 
Constant 1.455 0.111 -1.008 3.892 5.123 -5.971 
 (4.401) (8.060) (13.130) (18.055) (18.532) (13.460) 
       
Observations 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.069 
       
Notes: 3: Dependent variable is Municipality own revenues per capita in reel term. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for 
polynomials from 1
st
  to 6
th
. Municipality and year fixed effect included in regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered at the municipal level. Significant levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                         Table 9: The effect of alignment on Municipal Own Revenues with controls 
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment -6.131 0.051 1.684 -5.379 -2.210 -7.597 
 (3.792) (4.789) (6.231) (9.585) (12.236) (11.059) 
Constant -18.404*** -19.257*** -18.675** -18.154* -13.060 -19.674** 
 (6.238) (6.529) (8.114) (9.373) (9.723) (7.878) 
       
Observations 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.060 
       
Notes: 4: Dependent variable is Municipality own revenues per capita in reel term. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for 
polynomials from 1
st
  to 6
th
. Municipality and year fixed effect included in regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered at the municipal level. , Control variables include population, population under 18, property tax per capita as a proxy for 
local income, male ratio. Significant levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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       Table 10: The effect of alignment on municipal expenditures without controls 
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment -4.807 0.956 6.834 2.990 1.701 2.244 
 (2.963) (3.686) (4.566) (6.611) (8.500) (7.898) 
Constant 3.391 1.867 1.066 1.647 1.583 -4.074 
 (2.091) (3.191) (4.745) (6.298) (6.642) (5.546) 
       
Observations 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 13,985 
R-squared 0.152 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153 
 Notes: 5: Dependent variable is Municipality expenditures per capita in reel term. We exclude personnel salary payments to get more 
sense on public good provision. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for polynomials from 1
st
  to 6
th
. Municipality and year 
fixed effect included in regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipal level. Significant levels are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     Table 11: The effect of alignment on municipal expenditure with controls 
 Polynomials 
VARIABLES 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 
       
Alignment -2.769 2.699 5.928 1.842 1.269 1.072 
 (3.006) (3.759) (4.764) (6.846) (8.655) (7.871) 
Constant -55.767*** -57.438*** -57.618*** -56.884*** -55.181*** -59.982*** 
 (7.802) (7.932) (8.471) (9.131) (9.120) (8.392) 
       
Observations 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 13,140 
R-squared 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 
Notes: 6: Dependent variable is Municipality expenditures per capita in reel term. We exclude personnel salary payments to get more 
sense on public good provision. This table shows estimation of equation (1.1) for polynomials from 1
st
  to 6
th
. Municipality and year 
fixed effect included in regressions. Control variables include population, population under 18, property tax per capita as a proxy for 
local income, male ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipal level. Significant levels are *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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                 Table 12: The effect of alignment on grants in very close margins and local linear regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1% Margin 2% Margin 3% Margin 4% Margin 5% Margin 
      
Alignment 12.205*** 12.918*** 8.755** 5.008 4.884 
 (1.924) (1.924) (4.091) (3.927) (3.023) 
Constant -89.555 -6.178 5.307 6.480 10.801** 
 (79.978) (6.229) (6.646) (5.804) (4.444) 
      
Observations 434 873 1,345 1,776 2,191 
R-squared 0.271 0.318 0.192 0.147 0.003 
      
Notes: Table reports coefficients on alignment dummies.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses clustered at municipal level, significant 
levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, All regressions include municipality and year dummies. Control variables include population, 
population under 18, property tax per capita as a proxy for local income, male ratio. Columns present the alignment effect in grants where 
the margin of victory is very low in the elections.  
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Table 13: Local Linear Regression for optimal bandwidth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Local Linear 
Regression  
h 
Local Linear 
Regression half h 
Local Linear 
Regression double 
h 
    
Alignment 6.372*** 5.367** 4.772*** 
 (2.244) (2.488) (1.574) 
Population -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 9.047*** 11.747** 9.780*** 
 (1.900) (4.549) (1.236) 
    
Observations 2,859 1,476 5,189 
R-squared 0.004 0.199 0.008 
    
Notes:7: The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies and population variable. Controls include: 
municipal population, population under 18, property tax per capita as a proxy for local income, male ratio. 
Time dummies are included in all regressions. Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is 
+/−6.56. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in 
brackets are clustered at municipal level.
90 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Intergovernmental grants, Full Sample 
 
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
G
ra
n
ts
 (
T
L
 p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
)
-100 -50 0 50 100
Margin of Alignment
Sample average within bin 4th order global polynomial
Regression Function Fit
91 
 
Figure 2: Intergovernmental Grants for 1% Alignment Margin 
 
Figure 3: Intergovernmental Grants for 2% Alignment Margin 
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Figure 4:  Intergovernmental Grants for 3% Alignment Margin 
 
Figure 5: Municipal Own Revenues 
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Figure 6: Municipal Expenditures 
 
Figure 7: Property Tax (TL per capita) 
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Figure 8: Density of the Forcing Variable (Margin of Alignment) 
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Chapter 3 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS 
AND THE FLYPAPER EFFECT IN 
TURKEY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The debate about whether intergovernmental grants and local private income have 
similar effects on local expenditures has found an important place among researchers. 
In local public finance literature, this phenomenon has been called as the flypaper 
effect, which is a term derived from the statement for “money sticks where it hits”.  
The flypaper effect predicts that non-matching grants (revenue-sharing type) stimulate 
much more local spending than does income going to private citizens within the 
community. It can also be explained that money received in the public sector is more 
likely to remain in the public sector, whereas money received in the private sector is 
more likely to remain in the private sector (Fisher, R. C. 1982). The reason of this fact 
is that politicians at local level do not tend to cutting taxes when the local government 
receives revenue-sharing monies.   
3.2. The Politics of Grant 
Trying to model how receiving governments respond to grants need much more than 
an understanding of the economic equivalences between different grants formulas. 
Actual problem is how governments determine their spending and revenue decisions. 
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The decisions are the result of some kind of political process rather than simply 
economic. As such, a model that tries to explain governments’ responses to grants is 
only as good as its ability to model the underlying political process that generates 
their responses. Today, local governments and political forces have become numerous 
with growing communities and moved beyond the simplest one-person, one-vote 
direct democracies of the small village.  Therefore, it will be tough to capture all the 
political distinctions that take place in large communities and provincial governments. 
Nevertheless, most of economists have essentially chosen median voter model that is 
commonly used to develop empirical models of local (state or provincial) 
governments’ decisions on spending, revenues, and grants transferred by upper-tier or 
central government. The main assumption of the model is that a government’s 
spending and revenue decisions are those that match the preferences of the median 
voter in its jurisdiction. So, median voter is the one whose preferences on spending 
and revenues lie in the middle of the preferences. 
Several research theories have endeavoured to explain the flypaper effect 
phenomenon. There are two main discussions competing with each other. First, 
flypaper effect is caused by a fiscal illusion. Second, the reason of the effect is 
bureaucrats. We will give a brief explanation about these two models below. 
3.2.1. Fiscal Illusion 
In this view, the flypaper effect is the outcome of voter-taxpayer ignorance of fiscal 
illusion. Fiscal illusion literature argues that some features of the tax structure 
influence voter’s perceptions about how much they are financing the cost of public 
goods. Fiscal illusion suggests that when government revenues are not completely 
perceived  by taxpayers, then the cost of public goods is seen less expensive than 
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it actually is. The demand for government expenditures increases since taxpayers 
benefit from government expenditures from these unobserved revenues. As a result, 
politicians have an incentive to expand the size of government.   
3.3. The Bureaucratic Model 
According to these models, bureaucrats or local politicians are seen as exercising 
monopoly control over publicly produced goods and services. They use this power to 
compel elected officials into approving larger budgets at higher cost per unit than 
would otherwise occur, to improve their prestige and power (Niskanen, W. A. 1968, 
Wyckoff, P. G. 1988).  The flypaper effect might occur in the bureaucratic model 
since bureaucrats have much more knowledge regarding with grants and budget. This 
superior information enables him to obtain a budget in excess of that desired by the 
median voter (Sagbas, I. and N. T. Saruç 2004).  It is argued that the bureaucrats, who 
act strategically, disclose asymmetric information, responds the budget cuts by cutting 
the most popular programs first, and magnifies all budget requests (Schwallie, D. P. 
1989).  There are many other models and theories attempting to explain the reason of 
flypaper effect in public finance literature
15
. The main inference of the bureaucratic 
model explanation of the flypaper effect is that local authorities exert lesser local tax 
effort because managers in local depend on grants to finance their spending.   
3.4. Literature Review 
There have been numerous studies on flypaper effect and whether intergovernmental 
transfers stimulate or substitute local tax effort. Gramlich, E. M., H. Galper, S. 
                                                 
15
 See BAILEY, S. J., and S. CONNOLLY (1998): "The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further 
Research," Public Choice, 95, 335-361. 
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Goldfeld and M. McGuire (1973) pioneered one of the first discussions on the 
expenditure effects of intergovernmental transfers. They have categorized the 
intergovernmental grants as;  
(1) open-end matching grants, where the higher level of government finance some 
portion of the cost of certain expenditures of lower level of government. This 
obviously reduces the price of services provided by local government.  
(2) Closed-end lump sum transfers, where the higher level of government 
transfers a fixed amount of money to a lower level of government without 
dictating any aim on the use of money or changing any relative prices. This 
may be based on any allocation formula such as population criteria; Turkish 
local government system has this type of transfers, which is also called 
revenue-sharing programmes. 
(3) Closed-end categorical grants, where the higher level of government transfers 
a limited amount of money to be used for a particular programme started by 
lower level of government. This type of grants may be thought a mixed of first 
two categorizes (price of the programme is lowered, but the size of the grant is 
limited).  
According to the authors expenditure effect should be larger for open-end matching 
grants and smaller for closed-end lump-sum transfers, while the expenditure effect of 
closed-end categorical grants should be between those two effects. Hence, lump-sum 
grants should have only income effect, whereas matching grants should also have 
substitution (price) effect (Bailey, S. J. and S. Connolly 1998). However, recent 
literature finds that lump-sum grants should also have price effect since the grants 
help the local authority to reduce tax rates even if they provide the same level of local 
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public goods. Marginal costs of public funds are lower, which means that the effective 
price of providing the public goods is also reduced.  
Gramlich, E. M., H. Galper, S. Goldfeld and M. McGuire (1973) found that lump-sum 
transfers have larger effect on government spending than equivalent increase in 
private income. According to their estimation, each dollar of private income increases 
state and local expenditures by only 10 cents in the United States.  
The issue of flypaper effect has been hugely examined in the empirical literature 
beside theoretical studies (Acosta, P. 2010, Case, A. C., H. S. Rosen and J. R. Hines 
Jr 1993, Knight, B. 2002, Turnbull, G. K. 1998, Worthington, A. C. and B. E. Dollery 
1999). Most of these studies tend to focus on industrialised countries. (Pevcin, P. 
2011) examines the expenditure and tax effort effect of municipal transfers in 
Slovenia and the empirical analysis shows that transfer revenues (grants) have 
absolutely and relatively larger effect on municipal expenditures than equivalent 
increase in income. He also finds that substitution effect exists meaning transfer 
revenues have negative impact on municipal tax effort. 
Sagbas, I. and N. T. Saruc 2008, Sagbas, I. and N. T. Saruç (2004) examines whether 
grants cause the flypaper effect in the face of linear budget constraint in Turkey. They 
argue that the flypaper effect exists and could be explained by the bureaucratic model. 
In other study where the same authors contributed, they state that local tax effort is 
affected by the substitution and stimulative effects of grants on local expenditure in 
addition to the variance in the flypaper effect.   
Our paper on flypaper effect analysis contributes to the literature in Turkey in two 
ways. First, we use GMM, which is a more advanced method, considering there might 
be two-way causation in grants and income. It enables us to obtain more robust results 
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compared to previous studies on Turkey aforementioned above. This method also 
provides us more reliable estimates since the difference in magnitude between grant 
and income coefficients are close to each other, but statistically not equal based upon 
T-test. In previous studies there are huge difference on those coefficients which is 
most like due to OLS method used and not considering endogeneity.  
There are also studies that empirically test flypaper effect and find no evidence. For 
example Worthington, A. C. and B. E. Dollery (1999) investigate the flypaper effect 
for Australian local governments and could find no effect and interestingly their 
estimates show that intergovernmental transfers have statistically significant negative 
effect on local government expenditure. Becker, E. (1996) reveals that flypaper effect 
is in fact an illusion since the results are very sensitive to estimation technique and 
inappropriate functional form of estimation might generate different conclusions.  
3.5. Model Specification and Estimation 
We follow similar model used by (Sagbas, I. and N. T. Saruç 2004) and (Cárdenas, O. 
J. and A. Sharma 2011). We use a panel data set of 838 Turkish municipalities 
between 1997 and 2005 for the period. Since we do not have a fiscal data for the year 
of 1998, our data set jumps from 1997 to 1999. We include province (il) and district 
(ilce) municipalities but not town (belde) municipalities to our analysis we do not 
have enough data for towns. Out of 838 municipalities, the number of province 
municipalities is 59 and the remaining 739 are district municipalities. We obtain the 
fiscal data (grant, revenue, expenditure, etc) for municipalities from the Final 
Accounts provided by municipalities at the end of each year. The source for our data 
is Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). All economic variables are deflated using 
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price-index taken from State Planning Organization (DPT) of Turkey. Therefore 
grant, income and expenditure variables are in real terms in all specifications.  
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Grant 10.75 6.702 0.101 148.7 
Income 11.81 12.13 0.103 379.7 
Expend 24.11 21.58 0.112 645.6 
Population 46,289 104,864 754 990,073 
Popover18 52.98 16.17 7.606 229.0 
 
The equation we estimate is as follows:  
 0 0 1it it it it itEx Grants Income Z           (1) 
Where; 
itEx  = Per capita expenditure in 1998 Turkish liras of municipality i in year t. 
itIncome  = Per capita own source income 1998 Turkish liras of of municipality i in 
year t 
itGrants = Per capita unconditional grants in 1998 Turkish liras of of municipality i in 
year t 
itZ  = Social Characteristics of municipality i in year t. 
In this study, we follow the conventional approach (Courant, P. N., E. M. Gramlich 
and D. L. Rubinfeld 1978) where the flypaper effect is explored in the face of linear 
budget constraint because grants from central government are allocated without any 
matching requirements in Turkey. 
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In order for us to argue flypaper effect does exist, then the magnitude of the 
coefficient of grants variable must be bigger than the coefficient of income variable in 
equation (1), that is 0 1  . Moreover, we could say that unconditional grants have a 
stimulation effect on the local tax effort conditional on 0 1  , while if 0 1  , then it 
generates a substitution effect, which is likely to reduce the local tax effort. 
We begin estimating the equation (1) in the first column and add one variable at a 
time in order to check if the existence of the fly paper effect is sensitive to the 
included variables. That is, we first estimate equation (1) without controlling for the 
municipality’s characteristics, and later we add these characteristics one by one. Table 
1 presents the results from these estimations. 
As we see, the baseline model (column I) shows the existence of flypaper effect and 
grants also have stimulation effect on revenue collection effort. Additional 1 Turkish 
Lira (TL) grant increase leads municipal expenditure by more than 1 TL. Table 1 also 
suggest that revenue sharing (grant) stimulates local expenditure more than municipal 
local budget tax revenues (a proxy for local income). The same argument holds when 
we control for the population, population over 18 years old and lag expenditure 
(columns II, III, IV respectively). All specifications include time and municipality 
fixed effects in order to control for time invariant, municipality specific preferences 
for public spending, such as geography.  
Since we have a lagged dependent variable in our specification (IV) that makes the 
equation dynamic panel data, it may not be efficient in terms of econometric issues. 
Therefore we need to make sure that the previous findings are efficient and robust in 
dynamic panel data models. We estimate the following generalized equation: 
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 0 0 1 1 2it it it it it itEx Ex Grants Income Z             (2) 
 where: 
1itEx   = The per capita expenditure in 1998 Turkish Liras of municipality i in year t-1 
Why we adopt dynamic panel data estimation technique can be summarised as 
follows; 
First issue is that the variables Grants, Income are potentially endogenous in equation 
(2) due to two-way causality. In other words, not only Grants, Income impact 
expenditure, but they are affected by expenditure at the same. If there is an increase in 
expenditure, it is most likely to stimulate revenue in the municipality. An increase in 
expenditure is likely to influence unconditional grants since both of them might be 
correlated with the unobservable such as performance or state of the economy, 
political cycle etc. If we want to express it more technically, it is said that the 
regressors are likely to be correlated with the error term.  
Second problem arises due to the time-invariant municipality characteristics (fixed 
effects). Geographic factors, institutions and demographics of districts might be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The error term in equation (2) 
accommodates municipality fixed effects, iu , and the observation-specific errors, it : 
 it i itu     (3) 
Third issue is the fact of autocorrelation that is emerged with the inclusion of the 
lagged-dependent variable, 1itEx  .  
Since we have a panel dataset that consists of a short time dimension (T=8) and large 
municipality dimension (N=841). 
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Problem 1 and 2 above can be solved by using fixed-effects instrumental variables 
estimation (so called two-stage least squares or 2SLS). However we are not able to 
implement this technique due to the lack of exogenous instruments to identify the 
endogenous variables. Therefore, we use Arellano-Bond difference GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) estimator (Arellano, M. and S. Bond 1991), which 
is first proposed by (Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey and H. S. Rosen 1988). It enables us 
to use the lagged levels of the endogenous regressors as instruments. Endogenous 
variables become pre-determined and, therefore not correlated with the error term in 
equation (2). 
We cope with the problem of fixed effects by using the difference GMM estimator 
after transforming equation (2) into; 
 '0 1 1 2it it it it it itEx Ex Grants Income Z               (4) 
Municipality specific fixed effects are eliminated by transforming the regressors by 
first differencing, since it is a time-invariant factor. After first differencing equation 
(3), we get; 
 it i itu       (5) 
or 
 1 1 1( ) ( )it it i i it it it itu u                (6) 
where ∆ is a difference operator. 
In order to address problem (3) above, which is autocorrelation issue, the first-
differenced lagged-dependent variable (lag expenditure) is also instrumented with its 
past levels.  
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Arellano-Bond estimator was designed for “small T, large N” panels, meaning small 
time periods and many cross-sectional units. A shock to the municipality fixed effect 
in large time dimensional panels, which appears in the error term, will drop over time. 
Equivalently, the correlation of the lagged-dependent variable and the error term will 
not be significant anymore (see (Roodman, D. 2014). 
We show the estimates of the difference GMM estimators model specifications in 
Table 2. Column 2 presents the specification where all the explanatory variables are 
treated as exogenous while column 3 presents the estimates of the difference GMM 
estimator of model where Grants and Income variables are considered as potentially 
endogenous variables.  
GMM estimators require two conditions to be consistent. First condition is that error 
term should not be serially correlated and second, the lagged values of the explanatory 
variables must be accurate as instruments. (Arellano, M. and S. Bond 1991) suggested 
the examination of serial correlation in the error term to deal with the first one. This 
test seeks the first and second order serial correlation in the residuals from the 
regression in differences. It is a common fact that the differenced error term exhibits 
first order serial correlation even if the residuals in levels are not correlated. However, 
second order serial correlation indicates that the moment conditions are valid 
producing consistent estimates.  
We perform a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions for the exogenous 
instruments. Sargan tests the null hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments. 
When this null hypothesis is rejected, the validity of instruments is approved. Sargan 
and AR tests are reported at third row from the bottom of Table 2.  Tests in Column 2 
provide the evidence of second-order serial correlation and the instruments are not 
exogenous. This is an expected result since we were suspicious about endogeneity in 
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the beginning. However when we estimate the model treating “Grant and Income 
variables” as endogenous (Column 2), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation at the 10% confidence level and it means that the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term. In addition to that, we also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of instruments being exogenous at the 10% confidence level. Hence 
Column 2 in Table 2 enables us to use those results to conclude the model because it 
passes all the relevant tests. Table 2 and 3 shows the point estimates of regression 
based on our estimation strategy. However we need to test formally the coefficients of 
grant and revenue variables in order to pass judgement on the flypaper effect exists in 
Turkey. Therefore we run a formal test for 0H  : 1 2   against 1H : 1 2  and report 
the results in Table 2. We find that we can reject the equality hypothesis at the 5% 
level. We argue that grants have more impact on expenditure than local revenues in 
municipality level.  
Table 3 shows the logarithmic estimates of the same equation. When we compare 
Table 2 and Table 3, we see that the Fly paper effect still remains and its magnitude 
increases. Table 3 also reveals that our conclusions are robust to different estimation 
methods. Although (Becker, E. 1996) argues that the flypaper effect is highly 
sensitive to the specification of the expenditure function since the linear and 
logarithmic equations presents different results in the paper. However, in our 
estimations even if we use linear and logarithmic form of the expenditure function, 
our conclusion does not change and not depend on the functional form.    
The flypaper effect exists in Turkish local government finance and its magnitude is 
similar with the fixed effect estimation. This makes our analysis robust since our 
result holds even if the estimation strategy differs. Turkish municipalities also 
experience substitution effect of unconditional grants on the revenue collection 
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efforts. In other words, grants transferred by central government to municipalities in 
Turkey, substitute local revenues leading lesser local tax effort.  
3.6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate that the phenomenon of flypaper effect and its relation to 
the local tax effort, by using a panel data that consist of all province and district 
municipalities in Turkey between 1997 and 2005 excluding 1998 due to non-available 
fiscal data. The flypaper effect introduces the phenomenon of which an increase in the 
unconditional grants leads greater spending than equivalent increase in the local 
income. We use fixed effects and dynamic panel data specific GMM estimators to 
obtain the results. According to our estimations, the flypaper effect does exist for the 
Turkish municipalities. This result is robust to various model specifications and 
econometric techniques.  Turkish municipalities also experience substitution effect of 
unconditional grants on the revenue collection efforts. In other words, grants 
transferred by central government to municipalities in Turkey, substitute local 
revenues leading lesser local tax effort.  
(Duncombe, W. 1996) recommends that, if the flypaper effect exists, central 
government should develop a policy to predict funds required and assign 
unconditional grants accordingly. For instance, if local governments experiencing a 
budgetary gap are many, then there are two alternative options to improve the budget; 
either a reduction in grant or an increase in local taxes. In the flypaper theory, a 
reduction in grants would have more impact in lowering a budgetary gap than an 
increase in local taxes, because expenditures are increased by unconditional grants 
more than equivalent increased in private income. This fact explains that governments 
might use grants to affect local budget to reduce municipality spending. From the 
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political perspective, politicians who are aligned with the same political party in the 
municipality could assure more grants to be transferred to his/her jurisdiction when 
the elections are close so that the municipality provides more public good and 
influence the voters. By doing so, politicians might increase their probability of re-
elected in the next election.  
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Table 1: OLS Fixed Effects Estimation Results, Testing for Flypaper (Turkish Lira per capita), dependent variable 
is expenditure per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES I II  III  IV 
     
Grants 1.052*** 1.044*** 1.037*** 1.011*** 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.123) (0.123) 
Income 0.921*** 0.923*** 0.916*** 0.899*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.054) 
Population  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Popover18   0.027 0.026 
   (0.034) (0.030) 
Lag expenditure    0.104** 
    (0.048) 
Constant -6.382*** -4.876*** -6.039*** -9.412*** 
 (1.417) (1.709) (1.232) (2.217) 
     
Observations 6,958 6,958 6,559 6,437 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality  
Fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.674 0.674 0.726 0.766 
F statistic F(9,80)= 
373.43 
F(10,80)= 
326.15 
F(11,80)= 
334,81 
F(12,80)= 
297,85 
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions with expenditure per capita as dependent variable. The 
independent variables of interest are grant and income variables. Significant levels *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 , Figure in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. 
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Table 2 : Difference GMM Estimation, dependent variable is expenditure per capita. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Exogenous  Endogenous 
   
Grants 0.835*** 0.666** 
 (0.060) (0.328) 
Income 0.651*** 0.589* 
 (0.047) (0.345) 
Lag population growth 97.815** 18.078 
 (43.179) (20.261) 
Population -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Lag Expenditure 0.160*** 0.154*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) 
   
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.000 0.690 
   
Sargan test of  0.000 0.420 
over identification for the   
exogenous instruments   
T test for Equality  5.08** 4.22** 
Observations 2,503 2,503 
Number of Municipalities 838 838 
Notes: This table presents GMM regressions with expenditure per capita as dependent variable. The 
independent variables of interest are grant and income variables. Sargan tests the null hypothesis of 
overall validity of the instruments. When this null hypothesis is rejected, the validity of instruments is 
approved. Significant levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Figures in parenthesis are  
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  T test for equality of grant and revenue coefficients 
shows that null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. 
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Table 3: Logarithmic Estimates of variables in Table 2, dependent variable is log of expenditure per capita. 
Notes: This table presents GMM regressions in logarithmic form with expenditure per capita as 
dependent variable. The independent variables of interest are grant and income variables. Sargan 
tests the null hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments. When this null hypothesis is rejected, 
the validity of instruments is approved. Significant levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Figures in 
parenthesis are heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  T test for equality of grant and revenue 
coefficients shows that null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level when grants and income variables are 
treated as endogenous. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Exogenous Endogenous 
   
Loggrants 0.265*** 0.442*** 
 (0.027) (0.070) 
Logincome 0.293*** 0.140** 
 (0.014) (0.058) 
Lag population growth -1.808*** 0.282 
 (0.693) (0.263) 
Logpopulation 0.179 -0.793 
 (1.044) (0.482) 
Lag logexpenditure 0.047 0.145*** 
 (0.085) (0.048) 
   
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.000 0.307 
   
Sargan test of  0.000 0.235 
over identification for the   
exogenous instruments   
T test for Equality 1.14 8.58*** 
   
Observations 2,496 2,496 
Number of Municipalities 837 837 
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